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COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF HAZARDOUS 
SUBSTANCE EXPOSURE 
J. DAVID PRINCEt 
Hazardous wastes, threatening environmental and human safety, are 
being generated at an alarming rate. In this Article, J. David Prince 
discusses the threats posed by hazardous wastes and the remedies that 
are available in Minnesota for dealing with those threats. Professor 
Prince analyzes a proposed compensation scheme for victims of haz-
ardous waste exposure in Minnesota and suggests that a modification 
of that scheme be adopted by the Minnesota Legislature. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Contact with hazardous wastes, the pernicious product of in-
dustrialization, has become almost inescapable. Approxi-
mately 750,000 hazardous waste generators in the United 
States produce nearly 150 million tons of hazardous by-prod-
ucts annually} In Minnesota alone, nearly 2000 hazardous 
1. See Office of Public Awareness, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Haz-
ardous Waste-Fifteen Years and Still Counting 2 (OPA 98) (1980); 14 ENV'T REP. 
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waste generators operate to produce approximately 174,000 
tons of hazardous waste per year. 2 It is estimated that, nation-
ally, ninety percent of hazardous waste has been handled in a 
manner which threatens human health and the environment.3 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) figures show that ap-
proximately 1.2 million Americans are currently exposed to· 
health hazards.4 
On May 10, 1983, in response to the increasing incidence of 
environmental contamination by hazardous substances, Gover-
nor Rudy Perpich signed the Minnesota Environmental Re-
sponse and Liability Act (MERLA).5 This Act established a 
standard of strict and joint and several liability for the release6 
of hazardous substances.7 It also established a fund to provide 
(BNA) 715 (1983) (EPA Study says four times more waste generated annually than 
previously thought). 
2. Minnesota Waste Management Board, Hazardous Waste Management Re-
port IV-8, IV-14 (Dec. 1983) [hereinafter cited as WMR]. Approximately 45,000 tons 
of this amount (25.9%) has not been accounted for by hazardous waste management 
authorities. Id. at V-29. The Board estimates that 232,800 tons of waste will be gen-
erated in Minnesota in the year 2000. Id. at IV-27. 
3. See Hazardous Waste Management System: Identification and Listing of Haz-
ardous Waste, 45 Fed. Reg. 33,084 (1980). 
4. See SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PuBLIC WORKS, INJURIES AND DAM-
AGES FROM HAZARDOUS WASTE-ANALYSIS AND IMPROVEMENT OF LEGAL REMEDIES, S. 
REP. No. 97-12, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., pts. I, 32 (1982) [hereinafter cited as 301(e) 
REPORT] (emphasizing that estimate of 1.2 million Americans does not include latent 
injuries or future claims). 
5. Environmental Response and Liability Act, ch. 121, 1983 Minn. Laws 310 
(codified at MINN. STAT. ch. 115B (1984». 
6. MERLA defines "release" as.follows: 
"Release" means any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emlttmg, 
emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing 
into the environment which occurred at a point in time or which continues 
to occur. 
"Release" does not include: 
(a) Emissions from the engine exhaust of a motor vehicle, rolling stock, 
aircraft, watercraft, or pipeline pumping station engine; 
(b) Release of source, byproduct, or special nuclear material from a nu-
clear incident, as those terms are defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 
under 42 United States Code section 2014, if the release is subject to re-
quirements with respect to financial protection established by the Federal 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission under 42 United States Code section 2210; 
(c) Release of source, byproduct or special nuclear material from any 
processing site designated pursuant to the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation 
Control Act of 1978, under 42 United States Code section 7912(a)(l) or 
7942(a); or 
(d) Any release resulting from the application of fertilizer or agricul-
tural or silvicultural chemicals, or disposal of emptied pesticide containers 
or residues from a pesticide as defined in section 18A.21, subdivision 25. 
MINN. STAT. § 115B.02, subd. 15. 
7. MERLA defines "hazardous substance" as follows: 
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for the cleanup of contaminated hazardous waste sites m 
Minnesota.8 
In addition to MERLA's statutory strict liability remedy, vic-
tims of hazardous substance releases in Minnesota may also 
choose from a variety of existing remedies. These remedies 
include the traditional tort law theories of liability and dam-
ages, workers' compensation, and private health and disability 
insurance plans. 
(a) Any commercial chemical designated pursuant to the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act, under 33 United States Code section 1321(b)(2)(A); 
(b) Any hazardous air pollutant listed pursuant to the Clean Air Act, 
under 42 United States Code section 7412; and 
(c) Any hazardous waste. 
"Hazardous substance" does not include natural gas, natural gas li-
quids, liquefied natural gas, synthetic gas usable for fuel, or mixtures of such 
synthetic gas and natural gas, nor does it include petroleum, including 
crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise a hazardous waste. 
/d., subd. 8. 
"Hazardous waste" is defined as follows: 
(a) Any hazardous waste as defined in section 116.06, subdivision 13, 
and any substance identified as a hazardous waste pursuant to rules adopted 
by the agency under section 116.07; and 
(b) Any hazardous waste as defined in the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act, under 42 United States Code section 6903, which is listed or 
has the characteristics identified under 42 United States Code section 6921, 
not including any hazardous waste the regulation of which has been sus-
pended by act of Congress. 
Id., subd. 9. 
8. Id. §§ 115B.19-20. The Act required a legislative study regarding a victim 
compensation fund to compensate individuals injured by hazardous substances and 
not otherwise compensated. 
By July 1, 1984, the Legislative Commission on Waste Management 
shall conduct a study and make recommendations to the legislature on the 
creation of a compensation fund to compensate persons who are injured as 
the result of a release of a hazardous substance and who would not other-
wise be adequately compensated for their injuries. The study shall consider 
matters including the following: 
(a) The appropriate scope of compensation which should be provided 
by the fund including the extent of any compensation which should be avail-
able for medical expenses, disability, loss of income, physical impairment, 
and death; 
(b) Creation of a simple, speedy, and cost efficient claims procedure 
which provides an effective remedy for injured claimants; 
(c) Methods by which compensation can be financed by those who cre-
ate or contribute to the risk of injury from hazardous substance releases, 
including the manner by which the state may seek to recover amounts paid 
from the fund; and 
(d) Whether the fund should be established and administered at the 
federal or state level and the appropriate degree of state and federal cooper-
ation in providing compensation. 
1983 Minn. Laws 341 (not codified in Minnesota Statutes). For a discussion of the 
study done pursuant to this legislative directive, see infra notes 301-27 and accompa-
nying text. 
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While MERLA and other existing remedies provide some re-
lief for victims of hazardous substance exposure, these reme-
dies fall short of providing expedient, cost-efficient recovery of 
damages in all situations. Present laws and compensation 
mechanisms are simply inadequate to remedy all personal inju-
ries caused by hazardous substances. Accordingly, these com-
mon law and statutory remedies must be supplemented by a 
no-fault administrative scheme to ensure adequate compensa-
tion to those injured by hazardous substance exposure. 
Part I of this Article considers the evidence that personal in-
juries have been or are being caused by human exposure to 
hazardous substances and assesses the scope of the problem. 
Much of this discussion also concerns the problem of proving 
that a particular injury was caused by hazardous substance ex-
posure. Part II explores whether existing systems of compen-
sation, such as the tort law system and health insurance, 
adequately compensate these victims. Much of the discussion 
in this area analyzes the present tort law system: the plaintiffs 
burden of proof regarding causation of injury, the cost of liti-
gation and, where new liability standards are established, ques-
tions of retroactive liability and the imposition of joint and 
several liability against defendants. This part also addresses 
the statutory remedy in MERLA designed to solve problems 
faced in traditional tort law actions by persons injured as a re-
sult of exposure to hazardous substances. Finally, Part III 
briefly discusses the alternative compensation system de-
scribed in the study recently done by the Legislative Commis-
sion on Waste Management (LCWM) for the Minnesota 
Legislature. 
I. EVIDENCE OF INJURY AND THE NEED FOR COMPENSATION 
An estimation of the number of victims9 of hazardous sub-
9. The tenn "victim" is more difficult to define than hazardous substance. It 
generally does not include workplace or consumer product-related injuries, nor inju-
ries due purely to emotional distress with no associated physical injury. In one sense 
anyone who feels less safe in their environment is a victim of hazardous substances. 
Even if there is no actual threat, the perceived risk is a serious matter which dimin-
ishes the erlioyment of life. ·However, compensation to the general populace to alter 
widespread feelings of insecurity is simply not feasible. 
Physical injuries and monetary losses provide an alternative method for identify-
ing victims of hazardous substances. These losses can be more easily quantified than 
those suffered by individuals who feel insecure in their environment. Individuals 
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stance lO exposure would be considerably easier if adequate 
data sources on such injuries were available. Unfortunately, 
public health reporting agencies have not generated compre-
hensive statistics of human injury from hazardous substances. 
The creation of the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease 
Registry (A TSDR) under the federal Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CER-
CLA) II is the first step at the national level toward collecting 
with quantifiable personal injuries or property losses who do not receive adequate 
compensation for their losses constitute a more readily definable group of victims. 
Other difficulties surround the identification of victims. For example, a person 
could be injured because of the combined reaction between a hazardous substance 
and something in his lifestyle, such as smoking. Some hazardous substances only 
increase the probability of an injury and it is sometimes impossible to trace a particu-
lar injury back to an exposure to a hazardous substance. See Trauberman, Statutory 
Reform of "Toxic Torts ": Relieving Legal, Scientific, and Economic Burdens on the Chemical 
Victim, 7 HARV. ENVrL. L. REV. 177, 181 & n.15 (1983) (citing Epstein, The Role of the 
Scientist in Toxic Tort Case Preparation, TRIAL, July 1981, at 38). 
Usually those who face an increased risk of future injury, but no actual injury, as 
a result of hazardous substance exposure are not considered victims. With certain 
exceptions, employees injured at work are excluded because MERLA provides that 
there is no liability for injury to an employee for workplace exposure if the workers' 
compensation statute provides compensation. MINN. STAT. § 115B.05, subd. 3. 
10. MERLA defines "hazardous substance", in part, by reference to categories of 
chemicals which are designated by federal or state officials as hazardous. MINN. STAT. 
§ 115B.02, subd. 8; see supra note 7 (definition of hazardous substance). Thus, the 
number of substances which are classified as hazardous is quite large, and several 
documents and regulations itemize the hazardous substances and the processes that 
produce them. See, e.g., EPA Designation of Hazardous Substances, 40 C.F.R. 
§ 116.4 (1984). 
A number of substances which may endanger human health and the environ-
ment are excluded from coverage under MERLA. MERLA specifically excludes natu-
ral gas and synthetic gas usable as fuel, and excludes petroleum and petroleum 
fractions if the substances are not in waste form. Waste petroleum, however, is con-
sidered a hazardous substance. MINN. STAT. § 115B.02, subd. 8. Nuclear source, 
special nuclear, or nuclear by-product materials, as defined by the Atomic Energy Act 
of 1954, are not defined as hazardous substances by MERLA. Releases of such 
materials are also explicitly excluded from the definition of releases of hazardous 
substances. Id., subd. 15(b). 
Other substances which seem dangerous are not defined as hazardous if they 
reach the environment by "acceptable" methods. For example, the application of 
fertilizer, agricultural, or silvicultural chemicals and related disposal of empty pesti-
cide containers or residues is not considered the "release" of hazardous substances. 
/d., subd. 15(d). If, however, such chemicals are spilled during manufacture or trans-
port, or if the intent is to dispose of the chemical itself rather than an empty 
container with some residue, this would be the "release" of hazardous substances. 
The emission of chemicals that would normally be defined as hazardous, but that are 
released in consumer use or as the result of exhaust emissions, are not defined as 
hazardous. Id., subd. 15(a). 
11. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
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pertinent information on the health effects of hazardous 
substances. 
In Minnesota, no readily available data estimates the number 
of people who have been or may be injured by hazardous sub-
stances. The State Health Department does not gather health 
statistics on illness resulting from hazardous waste exposure 
and no other state agency is responsible for gathering this type 
of data. 12 There is data, however, on potential exposure. 
A. Current Data on Potential Exposure 
One source of information often seen as a basis for estima-
tion is the data on existing hazardous waste sites. Minnesota 
has a large number of contaminated hazardous waste sites. In 
1981, the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) listed 
thirty-six such sites. In 1982, the list grew to forty-five and by 
early 1985 the list stood at the current total of eighty-seven. I!! 
Approximately thirty-five more hazardous waste sites have 
been discovered and should be added to this list within the 
next two years. 14 The MPCA's eighty-seven hazardous waste 
sites contain a variety of hazardous substances including PCB, 
PCE, TCE, and PCP, as well as heavy metals, paint sludge, and 
solvents. 15 Of the eighty-seven identified hazardous waste 
sites currently listed, thirty-four appear on the EPA's National 
Priority List (NPL) of 418 sites. Twelve more sites have been 
proposed for addition to the NPL.16 As public awareness of 
the danger of hazardous wastes continues to grow, more haz-
ardous waste sites may be reported. 17 
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767-2811 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 9601-9657 (1982». 
12. Telephone interview with Dave Oray, Minnesota State Health Department 
(Apr. 4, 1984). 
13. Telephone interview with Gary Pulford, Chief of the Site Response Section 
within the Division of Solid and Hazardous Wastes of the Minnesota Pollution Con-
trol Agency (]an. 29, 1985); Gelbach, Toxic Shock-Minnesota s tough new hazardous-waste 
law has business down in the dumps, CORP. REP., Sept. 1983, at 64, 69. 
14. Telephone interview with Gary Pulford, Chief of the Site Response Section 
within the Division of Solid and Hazardous Wastes of the Minnesota Pollution Con-
trol Agency (March 20, 1985). 
15. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, Log of 87 Hazardous Waste Sites in 
Minnesota (]an. 1985) (available at Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, Roseville, 
Minnesota). 
16. WMR, supra note 2, at 111-34. 
17. Three hundred potential hazardous waste sites have been identified through 
citizen participation in an MPCA program that allows public tips on suspected waste 
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In addition to sites which are technically defined as hazard-
ous waste sites, solid waste disposal sites (sanitary landfills) are 
also grouped under a different heading by the MPCA. Five of 
these sanitary landfills are currently being considered for in-
clusion on the NPL.IS There are 130 permitted sanitary land-
fills in Minnesota which are potential hazardous waste sites. 
Besides simply listing these sites, MPCA files also contain 
specific data on each site. For each hazardous waste site in 
Minnesota, the MPCA file describes the site, lists any action 
which has been taken on the site to date, and the action which 
needs to be taken in the future. The most complete data is 
available for those sites which are the most dangerous or are 
best known to the public. Data for these sites has been exten-
sively analyzed and includes exposure routes, containment and 
waste characteristics, exposure target characteristics, and ob· 
served releases or injuries. 19 
The data exists only for the sites which are listed on the 
NPL. The data was developed to implement a hazard ranking 
system (HRS) by which the EPA ranks the danger, to both peo· 
pIe and the environment, of various sites around the nation.20 
The necessary data has been compiled for all of the eighty-
seven hazardous waste sites; data for thirty-four sites revealed 
hazards serious enough to be placed on the NPL. None of this 
data, however, estimates the potential number of injuries from 
sites. WMR, supra note 2, at 1II-35. More than 600 citizen complaints have been 
received on a hazardous waste hotline in Minnesota since 1981. Id. 
18. Telephone interview with Gary Pulford, Chief of the Site Response Section 
within the Division of Solid and Hazardous Wastes of the Minnesota Pollution Con-
trol Agency (May 30, 1984). 
19. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency Files (available at Minnesota Pollution 
Control Agency, Roseville, Minnesota). 
Data on exposure route characteristics includes the generic route (ground water, 
surface water, air, fire and explosion, or direct contact) and environmental character-
istics important to each route (e.g. depth to aquifer, soil permeability, net precipita-
tion, surface slope, intervening terrain, nearest surface water, maximum 24 hour 
rainfall). Containment characteristics include the natural or artificial means which 
have been used to minimize or prevent a contaminant from injuring the environment 
(e.g. liners, collection systems, sealed containers, diversion structures). Waste char-
acteristics include toxicity, persistence, quantity, reactivity, incompatibility with other 
substances, and ignitability. Target characteristics include types of ground or surface 
water use, distance to nearest well, distance to sensitive environment, population 
served by ground water or surface water intake within three miles downstream, land 
use, number of buildings and population in vicinity of site, and population within two 
and four air miles. Id. 
20. Id. 
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a site, or the amount of compensation needed to restore In-
jured parties to their economic position before the injury. 
B. Assessing the Scope of the Injuries Problem and Proving Actual 
Injury 
No accurate assessment of the number of personal injuries 
caused by hazardous substance exposure can be made by ex-
amining existing data on hazardous waste sites in Minnesota 
and combining that data with existing scientific methods of 
identifying a causal link between hazardous substances and in-
jury or disease. This point deserves emphasis. It is not a mat-
ter of being imprecise; rather, it cannot be done. Even a 
general estimate of injury based directly on site data is impos-
sible. The calculation of such an estimate involves many steps 
for which little or no crucial data is available. Consequently, 
this approach will not lead to supportable estimates. Further-
more, the difficulties in estimating the scope of the whole in-
jury problem also present difficulties of proof in any given case 
of injury. Nevertheless, the scope of the whole problem can be 
roughly calculated by alternative methods.21 These alternative 
21. 301(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. I, at 31-32. The 301(e) Study Group did not 
conduct any original research to determine the number of potential injuries resulting 
from hazardous substances. Instead it gathered the existing data it could locate on 
this issue. The 1980 EPA estimate of 1.2 million Americans currently exposed to 
health hazards from hazardous dump sites is mentioned, but the Report emphasized 
that the estimate provides no indication of latent injuries and future claims. [d. at 32; 
see Leunet, Handling Hazardous Wastes, ENV'T, Oct. 1980, at 7. 
A section of the Report discussing the quantification of injury states: 
The discussion oflegal issues relating to injuries from hazardous wastes 
must proceed in a setting off actual and scientific uncertainty because, at this 
time, in mid-1982, it is impossible to determine the number of persons who 
have been injured or who could be injured by exposure to such sites. 
301(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. I, at 21 (footnote omitted). 
The Report described a general approach for determining the potential number 
of hazardous substance exposure victims. Initially, all dump sites would have to be 
located and their contents determined. Then the waste sites and surrounding areas 
would have to be examined to determine if the possibility of human exposure and 
injury existed. Despite the conceptual simplicity of this approach, the Report cor-
rectly points out the substantial obstacles to estimating potential victims. It was rec-
ognized then, as is true today, that "public identification of a significant problem is at 
an early stage." [d., pt. 2, at A-8. See also Grad, Hazardous Waste Victim Compensdion: 
The Report of the § 301(e) Superfund Study Group: A Response to Theodore L. Garrett, 13 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,234 (1983). Since the release of the 301(e) Report, no statistical 
studies on injuries or major health effects surveys have been published. Telephone 
interview with Frank P. Grad, Reporter for the 30 I (e) Study Group (March 19, 1985). 
Other studies include the OMB's study to estimate the cost of a hazardous waste 
victim compensation program, telephone interview with Robert Wilmore, OMB offi-
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methods are still rather limited in their accuracy because they 
are all indirect methods of estimating injury numbers. 
1. HazardotL5 Waste Site Data 
The most direct method of injury estimation would be made 
directly from data on the exposure of humans to hazardous 
waste sites. Unfortunately, this approach cannot currently be 
used to provide any reliable estimate of injury simply because 
the necessary data is not available. The most complete data on 
hazardous waste sites in Minnesota is in the MPCA files com-
piling the data and HRS scores for all eighty-seven hazardous 
waste sites.22 
Even with complete HRS data on a particular site, reliable 
conclusions cannot be drawn about the potential number of 
injuries resulting from that site. The HRS does not quantify 
either the probability or magnitude of harm that could result 
from a waste facility. Rather, it ranks facilities in terms of the 
potential threat they pose. 
The steps necessary to estimate injuries from hazardous sub-
stance sites are: 
1. The number of sites yet to be discovered or created 
must be estimated and added to existing known sites.23 
2. The specific substances in each site must be identified. 
cial (May 30, 1984), and the Chemical Manufacturers Association study conducted by 
the Universities Associated for Research and Education in Pathology (UAREP). See 
TAKING A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE, PUBLIC COMPENSATION: THE NEED FOR HEALTH EF-
FECTS STUDIES (Chemical Manufacturers Association 1983); Telephone conversation 
with Gordon Strickland, Deputy Technical Director ofCMA (May 31,1984). Again, 
however, these studies do not estimate the number of potential injuries from expo-
sure to hazardous substances. 
Although these studies demonstrate that preliminary steps are being taken to 
develop accurate information regarding toxic substances health effects and their 
scope, they provide little help for the present task of estimating the number of in-
jured parties in Minnesota who are in current need of monetary relief because of 
exposure to hazardous substances. The studies also fail to provide information re-
garding latent injuries and future claims. 
22. Telephone interview with Pulford, supra note 13. 
23. The MPCA has discovered new sites on a geometrically increasing basis each 
year for the past three years. New discoveries will probably taper off in time because 
most testing sites will have been discovered, and because increasing regulation and 
public awareness will prevent the large-scale creation of new sites. The rate of haz-
ardous waste site discovery will not reach zero (no new discoveries) because indus-
trial activity will accidently or illegally create new sites. Furthermore, most, if not all, 
Minnesota landfills contain some concentration of various toxic substances. St. Paul 
Pioneer Press, Oct. II, 1983, at 2C, col. 2. 
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Even in some existing sites the substances have not been 
identified.24 
3. The physical pathways for a substance's movement must 
be identified; this path varies with each site.25 
4. The concentrations of substances in these pathways 
through time and across geographic areas must be evaluated. 
These factors also vary with each site.26 
24. See Seltzer, Personal Injury Hazardous Waste Litigation: A Proposal For Tort Reform, 
10 B.C. ENvrL. AFF. L. REV. 797,819 (1983). At Woburn, Massachusetts, one of the 
most celebrated sites in the United States, no study has identified the precise number 
and volume of hazardous substances present. Id. 
Hazardous substances at many sites are buried in drums. No sampling method 
can accurately determine the contents of buried containers. 301 (e) REPORT, supra 
note 4, pt. 2, at A-6 (quoting the DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, 
REPORT ON THE POTENTIAL HEALTH EFFECTS OF TOXIC CHEMICAL DUMPS, reprinted in 
SEN. COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PuBLIC WORKS, HEALTH EFFECTS OF TOXIC POLLU-
TION: A REPORT FROM THE SURGEON GENERAL AND A BRIEF REVIEW OF SELECTED ENVI-
RONMENTAL CONTAMINATION INCIDENTS WITH A POTENTIAL FOR HEALTH EFFECTS, 96TH 
CONG., 20 SESS. (Comm. Print 1980) at 27-35). Identification of chemicals at a site is 
complicated by the fact that the various sampling techniques available can cause an 
unintended release of the hazardous substances being tested. Id. Furthermore, 
when different chemicals are combined at one site, the resulting chemical mixtures 
may be impossible to identify. 
25. Telephone interview with Pulford, supra note 13; Telephone interview with 
Michael Kanner, Minnesota Pollution Control Agency Site Response Section-Unit 
Supervisor (Nov. I, 1983). 
A released hazardous substance follows a variety of pathways to enter the human 
body. These substances may be delivered via the atmosphere, food chains, ground 
or surface water, or contaminated soil. The prevalent pathway for the eighty-seven 
Minnesota hazardous waste sites is through ground or surface water. Id. 
Groundwater is the most common pathway for hazardous substances, but effec-
tive monitoring of groundwater concentrations is problematic for several reasons. 
301 (e) REPORT, supra note 4, pI. I, at 28-29. There is no general agreement on drill-
ing methods, sampling frequency, standard quality assurance procedures, or the ade-
quate number of wells needed. The risk exists that drilling of monitoring wells could 
contaminate clean aquifers. Id. at 29. Chemical concentrations are discoverable, ifat 
all, only after continuing samples are taken. Such discovery does not provide much 
information regarding the duration and amount of concentrations before sampling 
procedures began. 
26. See, e.g., FMC Corp. Consents to Response Order for Clean up of Fridley, Minn., Waste 
Site, 14 ENV'T. REP. (BNA) 255 (1983). 
The FMC site in Fridley is located on the Mississippi River approximately one 
quarter mile upstream from the drinking water intake for Minneapolis. The site con-
tains trichloroethylene (TCE), a known human carcinogen. Trace amounts of TCE 
have been discovered in the Mississippi River and in Minneapolis drinking water. On 
June 8, 1983, FMC agreed to clean up the site by excavating 58,000 cubic yards of 
TCE-contaminated soil and placing the soil in an on-site containment facility. Id. 
The FMC site is an extreme example of potential exposure from TCE ingestion to an 
inordinately large number of Minnesotans from a single hazardous waste site. 
Although the FMC site is now being cleaned up according to the specifications of 
environmental agencies, the continuing effects of past practices at this site are 
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5. Given the concentrations of substances in the pathways, 
the durations and amounts of exposures to humans with differ-
ent behavior patterns and with different levels of mobility must 
be examined.27 
6. The durations and amounts of human exposures to po-
tentially interactive environmental influences through time and 
across geographic areas must be determined.28 
7. The toxic effects of both the hazardous substances and 
the interaction with environmental influences must be evalu-
ated using indeterminate medical tests.29 The toxic effects 
often vary with individual characteristics such as race, age, and 
sex.30 
The lack of reliable data needed to take many, if not all, of 
these steps combine to make reliable estimates of injury from 
existing hazardous waste site data impossible. This data defi-
ciency can also make the proof of a given claim very difficult or 
impossible. Consequently, other bases for estimating injury 
must be considered. 
thought to be the source of contamination of the principal drinking water aquifer in 
the Twin Cities area. !d. at 256. 
27. Cf Trauberman, supra note 9, at 181. Humans in the same location have very 
different behavior patterns which expose them differently to the same contaminated 
pathway. Different amounts ot contaminated water may be ingested. due to exercise 
levels. cooking and eating patterns. or extensive dining away from home. These dif-
ferent behavior patterns create different exposures to different pathways. and the 
manner of entry may determine the concentration and manifestation of symptoms. 
Ingestion. inhalation, and direct skin contact comprise the methods of exposure to 
dangerous chemicals into the body from their environmental pathways. The affected 
population itself also changes as individuals move into or out of the contaminated 
pathways. ld. 
28. Victims ingest different amounts of other interactive foods and chemical 
sources. Certain hazardous substances react in combination with these other envi-
ronmental influences to create a danger that is more serious than either chemical by 
itself. See Hoover. Environmental Cancer in PUBLIC CONTROL OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
HEALTH HAZARDS 50 (E. Hammond & I. Selikoff eds. 1979) (other sources causing 
cancer include exposure to toxic chemicals. radiation. diet. drugs. and personal 
habits). 
29. Although the health effects of relatively high concentrations of some chemi-
cals are known, usually no causal link can be drawn from data concerning low to 
medium concentrations. See. e.g., CHRONIC DISEASES DIVISION AND CLINICAL CHEMIS-
TRY DIVISION. CENTER FOR ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH. CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL. 
STUDY PROTOCOL: POLY-CHLORINATED BIPHENYLS (PCBs). EXPOSURE AT SUPERFUND 
WASTE SITES 23 Gune 8, 1983). 
30. 301(e) REPORT, supra note 4. pt. 1. at 31-32. The 30I(e) Study Group noted 
that "[t]he scientific problem of estimating the number of victims is so great because 
the uncertainties multiply at each step of the process of determining the number of 
persons exposed and the causal link between exposure and injury." !d. 
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2. Medical and Scientific Methodologies 
There are five basic scientific methods of identifying a causal 
link between hazardous substances and injury from disease: 
case clusters,31 structural toxicology,32 laboratory study of sim-
ple test systems, animal bioassays,33 and epidemiology. The 
EPA relies on all of these methods in estimating the danger of 
hazardous substances to humans. To some extent, the weak-
nesses of one method are partially overcome by the strengths 
of another method in determining hazardous substance effects. 
But the use of these methods is costly and still results in sig-
nificant uncertainty. The scientific methodologies mentioned 
above result at most in a finding of a probability of injury in 
humans. Case clusters, structural toxicology, and the study of 
simple systems do not provide probabilities which may be used 
with confidence. Ultimately, none of these scientific methods 
provides absolute evidence of cause and effect except under 
extreme exposure conditions. These methods are often incon-
clusive in tying a substance to a specific injury when exposures 
are not extreme in duration or concentration and when there 
are unknown combined effects with other unidentified environ-
mental influences. In certain instances, a given chemical will 
cause different injuries in different persons, further complicat-
ing the task of estimating the total number of persons injured. 
When these uncertainties are combined with the problems in 
assessing the potential for harm of any given hazardous sub-
stance site it is easy to understand why reliable estimation of 
total human injuries from hazardous substance exposure is so 
problematic. It also adds emphasis to the problem of proving 
any particular case. 
In order to reliably estimate the total number of injuries, the 
hazardous substance concentration levels would have to be de-
termined at each geographic point where, and over all periods 
when, exposure might take place. The total number of people 
with each relevant set of injury characteristics (consumption 
patterns, duration and intensity of exposure, age, exposure to 
synergistic agents, and so on) would have to be determined 
31. See, e.g., Shear, Seale & Gottlieb, Evidencefor Space-Time Clustering of Lung Can-
cer Deaths, 35 ARCHIVES OF ENV. HEALTH 335 (1980). 
32. See, e.g., RaIl, Threshold7, in ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 22, 164-65 (1978). 
33. See Seltzer, supra note 24, at 816. 
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and then multiplied by the probability of injury for people pos-
sessing those characteristics. 
Even if the total number of injuries could be estimated, eval-
uation of the cost of adequate compensation would require 
knowledge of how these injuries accrue to different age groups 
and different occupations. Any evaluation of the economic 
losses to be compensated from loss of earnings and other dam-
ages associated with the injury could then be made. 
3. The LCWM Study's Injury Estimate 
Until the LCWM Study was done, no other study suggested 
possible methods for reliably estimating injuries. The United 
States Senate's 301 (e) Report,34 for example, simply con-
cluded that while no one knows the number of injuries, it is 
known that there are hazardous waste sites, that people are ex-
posed to chemicals from these sites, and that there must there-
fore be injuries to be compensated.35 The LCWM Study used 
a number of methods to estimate the number of injuries and 
the number of people who are inadequately compensated for 
injuries from hazardous substance exposure. 
The Study begins with the proposition that those persons in 
need of compensation for hazardous substance related injuries 
are likely to seek outside help. They may seek the assistance of 
a physician, an attorney, family and friends, or even the press. 
By surveying the number of contacts made to outside sources 
of help, the Study makes a rough estimate of the current 
number of injured parties.36 
A number of sources of data upon which an estimate could 
be based were considered. Physicians have the best skills for 
verifying the injury source, and most injured persons will seek 
some medical advice on their condition.37 Attorneys are also 
34. See supra note 21. 
35. Id. 
36. A direct survey would be extraordinarily time consuming-if the number of 
injuries were small the survey sample would need to be unusually large. Even if such 
a survey were conducted, the information obtained from the respondents would be 
of doubtful quality since injured persons are unlikely to have the expertise to know 
the cause of their injuries. The possibility of skewed responses from hypochondriacs 
is also quite large. 
37. A physician survey might be expected to pick up nearly all injured parties. 
Unfortunately, while all people injured by hazardous substances may go to a physi-
cian, this does not mean that a physician survey of such patient contacts will lead to 
reliable or approximate estimates of numbers injured because the possibility of mis-
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fairly skilled at determining the source of an injury. Attorneys 
act as coordinators of medical or engineering evidence, or 
other evidence needed to verify that a hazardous substance was 
present, that the injured party was exposed to that substance, 
and that the exposure caused the injury.38 The press usually 
notes the more newsworthy instances of injury claimed to re-
sult from hazardous substances exposure, though there is no 
guarantee that those claims are accurate. 
A physician survey was rejected as impractical primarily be-
cause most physicians' diagnoses will not go beyond determin-
ing the nature of a patient'S disease or injury and actually 
attempt to determine the cause of the injury. Furthermore, the 
required sample from a physician survey would be quite large 
diagnosis is substantial when hazardous substances are involved. Cj Seltzer, supra 
note 24, at 810 (the cause of injury may be a product of multiple contributing factors, 
making it virtually impossible to identify the precise cause of the injury). 
In addition, while exposure to hazardous wastes causes acute and chronic health 
effects, a physician is more likely to see and diagnose the acute effects. "Even after 
exposure to medically dangerous levels of contamination, symptoms of disease may 
develop slowly and may be difficult to identify in their early stages." Seltzer, supra 
note 24, at 811. 
The average physician is not trained to diagnose chronic exposures, and chronic 
exposures are the greatest concern because they are more numerous than incidences 
of acute exposure. Since hazardous substance exposures, and particularly chronic 
exposures, are so difficult to diagnose, the accuracy of the data obtained by a physi-
cian survey is sufficiently suspect and an estimate of injuries based on that data is 
unreliable. Telephone interview with Dr. Vincent Garry, Director, Environmental 
Pathology Lab, University of Minnesota (Nov. 1983). 
38. A survey of attorneys would determine the number of injured parties by de-
termining the number of clients and potential clients who are injured from hazardous 
substances. As with the physician survey, the first step would be to select a sample of 
attorneys throughout the state. Attorneys would be contacted to determine if they 
had clients who had been injured as a result of exposure to any hazardous substances 
as defined by MERLA. The degree of impairment would be determined to estimate 
the potential economic loss which the client was suffering. A statewide estimate of 
hazardous substance victims would be extrapolated from the responses of the repre-
sentative sample of attorneys. 
A distinct advantage of the attorney survey is that many individuals who have 
already been adequately compensated by health insurance or other compensation 
schemes will not go to attorneys for further compensation through the tort system. 
The survey will not count these individuals as victims because they have already re-
ceived adequate compensation. 
For the results of a survey of Minnesota attorneys conducted to determine the 
number of individuals injured by hazardous waste, see J.D. PRINCE & P. HAMILTON, A 
STUDY OF COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE EXPOSURE, A RE-
PORT OF THE LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION ON WASTE MANAGEMENT TO THE MINNESOTA 
LEGISLATURE, pt. I, at 23-25 (Dec. 1984) (132 individuals claiming injury or exposure 
to toxic substances) [hereinafter cited as WASTE MANAGEMENT COMMISSION REPORt]. 
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and, if injuries number only in the tens of people, the survey 
may miss injured persons altogether. 
A survey of the press coverage of hazardous substance-re-
lated stories showed an increasing amount of coverage, reflect-
ing an increasing public interest in the subject, but provided 
no dependable information upon which an estimate could be 
based.39 
A survey of attorneys was made by the Study.40 The sample 
was developed by compiling a list from the Minnesota Trial 
Lawyers Association (MTLA), from the MPCA, and from refer-
ence to news media reports of attorneys known to have dealt 
with some hazardous substance-related claims. Each of these 
attorneys was contacted to determine the number of clients 
which the attorney was aiding in hazardous substance litigation 
or negotiations, and also to obtain referrals to other attorneys 
practicing in hazardous substance litigation. After a number of 
attorneys were contacted and referrals added to the initial list, 
it was found that responses to the referral question provided 
names which were already on the list, indicating that all or 
nearly all attorneys with hazardous substance-related claims 
had been contacted. 
The results of this survey showed that 132 people in Minne-
sota were claiming injury from hazardous substances. Most of 
the claims were for the costs of replacing a water supply but a 
few persons had alopecia or cancer. A few persons who con-
tacted attorneys decided not to litigate because of costs. There 
did not seem to be an accelerating trend in the number of con-
sultations or suits in the last five years. 
Finally, California has implemented an administrative com-
pensation scheme for personal injury victims of hazardous sub-
stance exposure. The limited claims experience under this 
scheme was examined. An effort was made to compare Cali-
39. The press is also likely to try to contact injured parties because such specific 
incidences of injury along with an interview of the injured party would be a news-
worthy event. 
A press survey will not be an accurate indicator of the number of claims which 
might arise under an administrative compensation system. However, the press sur-
vey will indicate the amount of public interest in the subject, and it will be of interest 
to compare the injuries indicated by the press with the injuries indicated by other 
methods. For a discussion of the survey of Minneapolis Star and Tribune articles as 
another method of estimating the number of people injured by hazardous wastes in 
Minnesota, see WASTE MANAGEMENT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 38, at 25-26. 
40. See WASTE MANAGEMENT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 38, at 23-25. 
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fornia, a state with a fund of very limited accessibility and cov-
erage and a much larger population, with Minnesota. The 
California study revealed that the number of persons filing 
claims for injuries in their persons or property is around ten 
per year and the number of inquiries about property damage 
claims is about 107 per year. The number of people with ex-
clusively personal injuries is presumably smaller.41 
Based on all of this information the LCWM Study estimates 
that the number of persons injured in Minnesota each year as a 
result of exposure to hazardous substances numbers in the 
tens of persons. Obviously, that indirect estimate does not 
provide a precise figure. It is, however, an estimate based on 
the best information available and is the best estimate to date 
of the scope of the problem in Minnesota. 
II. THE LIMITATIONS OF EXISTING REMEDIES AND 
COMPENSATION SYSTEMS FOR TOXIC TORT VICTIMS 
Victims of hazardous substance releases in Minnesota may 
choose from various common law and statutory remedies. 
These include MERLA's strict liability cause of action; tradi-
tional tort law theories of liability and damages, modified in 
part by statute; workers' compensation if the injury arises out 
of the victim's employment; private health and disability insur-
ance plans; and public survivor, disability, and health insur-
ance plans including Medicare and Medicaid. This section 
examines the effectiveness of these existing remedies in solv-
ing the problem of victim compensation. 
A. MERLA's Response to Traditional Legal Limitations to Recovery 
1. Scope of Liability and Recovery Under MERLA 
As the law of torts has developed, fault-based liability has 
been displaced by strict liability with respect to a number of 
activities, such as the manufacture and sale of defective con-
sumer products. MERLA is part of this development in the 
law.42 Section U5B.05, subdivision 1 of MERLA provides a 
41. Telephone interview with Gerald Jones, Program Coordinator for the Haz-
ardous Substance Program, State Board of Control, California (March 22, 1985). 
This agency is not the only one available for victims of hazardous substance exposure 
in California. Other agancies may contain additional data that is not reflected in the 
data compiled by the California Hazardous Substance Program. Id. 
42. See Environmental Response and Liability Act, ch. 121,1983 Minn. Laws 310 
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statutory remedy for victims of hazardous substance releases:43 
"[A]ny person44 who is responsible for the release45 of a haz-
ardous substance from a facility46 is strictly liable. . . for. . . 
d "47 amages .... 
a. Liability Principle 
t. Strict liability 
At common law, a person injured or suffering property or 
other losses as a result of exposure to hazardous substances (a 
"toxic tort") generally had to show that his injury or loss was 
the result of someone's "fault," that is, that someone had acted 
negligently or without care, causing the injury or loss. In some 
special cases, liability was "strict," that is, imposed without 
proof of negligence.48 This strict liability approach has re-
cently been expanded to include toxic torts. These injuries 
(most sections of the act were effective July I, 1983) (codified at MINN. STAT. § 115B 
(1984)). 
43. Section 115B.04, subd. I of MERLA also provides a remedy, but the dam-
ages available under that section are different in kind from the damages available 
under § 115B.05, subd. 1. Section 115B.04, subd. I(a)-(c) allows the recovery of 
"[a]1I reasonable and necessary response costs incurred by ... political subdivi-
sion[s] ... [a]1l reasonable and necessary removal costs incurred by any person; and 
... [a]1l damages for any injury to ... natural resources .... " Id. Section 
115B.05, subd. 1 (a), (b), on the other hand, allows recovery of damages of a more 
personal nature, including individual economic loss and health care costs. Id. 
44. "Person" is defined as "any individual, partnership, association, public or 
private corporation or other entity including the United States government, any in-
terstate body, the state and any agency, department or political subdivision of the 
state." MINN. STAT. § 115B.02, subd. 12. 
45. See supra note 6 (definition of "release"). 
46. "Facility" is defined as: 
(a) Any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline 
(including any pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works), well, 
pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor 
vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft; 
(b) Any watercraft of any description or other artificial contrivance 
used or capable of being used as a means of transportation on water; or 
(c) Any site or area where a hazardous substance, or a pollutant or 
contaminant, has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or other-
wise came to be located. 
MINN. STAT. § 115B.02, subd. 5(a)-(c). 
47. Id. § 115B.05, subd. 1. 
48. In Minnesota, strict liability for non-natural uses of land was adopted as early 
as 1871 in Cahill v. Eastman, 18 Minn. 324 (1871). For a discussion of the applica-
tion in Minnesota of strict liability based on the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher, see 
Mahowald v. Minnesota Gas Co., 344 N.W.2d 856, 860 (Minn. 1984); II WM. MrrCH-
ELL L. REV. 599 (1985) (Case Note on Mahowald). For a discussion of the various 
common law strict liability theories, see infra notes 278-99 and accompanying text. 
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and losses are an inevitable consequence of the generation, 
use, and disposal of hazardous substances in our society. It is 
considered inequitable to require those injured to bear the 
cost of toxic injury unless they can show someone was at fault. 
This view holds that losses caused by an enterprise or activity 
"ought to be borne by those persons who have some logical 
relationship with that enterprise or activity. "49 Those involved 
in the generation, transportation, and disposal of hazardous 
substances will begin to internalize the full costs of that pro-
cess so that the costs of these injuries and losses are reflected 
in the prices of their goods and services.50 The strict liability 
standard imposed by MERLA makes those involved with haz-
ardous substances liable for resulting injuries or losses regard-
less of care or fault. 51 
ii. Joint and Several Liability 
Another difficulty encountered in applying traditional com-
mon law rules to toxic torts results from the fact that several 
parties can be involved in hazardous substance generation and 
disposal52-the generator of the substance, the transporter, 
and the owners or operators of the disposal facility. When sev-
eral parties play different and unconnected roles which lead to 
the eventual release of a hazardous substance from a facility, 
an injured party proceeding under the common law rules must 
establish a cause of action against each party.53 These rules 
require that the plaintiff bear the burden of proving that it is 
more likely than not that the conduct of a defendant was a sub-
stantial factor in causing the release. When a number of parties 
contribute separately to the result, this burden may be impos-
sible to sustain against anyone of them.54 This would mean, 
for example, that a generator and a disposer of the same haz-
ardous substance are very unlikely to be jointly liable for an 
injury caused by that substance. MERLA solves this problem 
49. See Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 153, 
158 (1976). 
50. See Comment, Common Law and the Toxic Tort: Where Does Superfund Leave the 
Private Victim of Toxic Torts?, 86 DICK. L. REV. 725, 739 (1982). 
51. See MINN. STAT. § I15B.05, subd. 1; if. id., subds. 2-12 (defenses to strict 
liability) . 
52. See 30 I (e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. I, at 53. 
53. Id., pt. I, at 59. 
54. See id., pt. I, at 57-58. 
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by making all persons who are responsible for the release of a 
hazardous substance 'jointly and severally" liable for the 
plaintiffs injury or loss.55 
Where joint and several liability exists, an equity problem 
can arise when a defendant's causal connection with the re-
lease is too attenuated to justify making him liable for the en-
tire damage award. Section 115B.09 of MERLA addresses this 
problem by limiting the individual liability of any single de-
fendant. It specifies that where the percentage of fault attribu-
table to a defendant is determined under the Comparative 
Fault Act,56 the liability of the defendant for damages shall be 
limited to two times that percentage of comparative fault. 57 In 
55. See MINN. STAT. § 1158.05, subd. 1. The meaning of joint liability is that two 
or more persons may be joined as defendants in the same action by an injured plan-
tiff where the action of those defendants has produced a single injury. The Minne-
sota Supreme Court has adopted joint liability for indivisible injuries in other 
contexts and holds that joint liability arises "whether the acts of those jointly liable 
were concerted, merely concurrent, or even successive in point of time." Tolbert v. 
Gerber Indus., 255 N.W.2d 362, 366 n.l (Minn. 1977) (joint liability theory applied 
in product liability case). 
The meaning of several liability is that each defendant may be sued individually 
and held completely liable for the injury even though others have also contributed to 
that injury. See W. PROSSER, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON 
ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 47, at 327-28 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER & 
KEETON]. If liability is both joint and several, the plaintiff can sue one, or all, or any 
number of the responsible defendants. Kisch v. Skow, 305 Minn. 328, 331, 233 
N.W.2d 732, 734 (1975). For any judgment awarded to the plaintiff, the defendants 
are jointly liable. They are also each liable for the full amount if other defendants 
have not been joined in the suit or are unable for any reason to help satisfy the 
plaintiffs judgment. The concept of joint and several liability transfers the burden of 
allocating and apportioning damages between or among defendants from the plain-
tiff to the defendants. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra, § 47, at 327-28. This transfer is 
of critical importance to a plaintiff who seeks to recover the full amount of his 
damages. 
56. MINN. STAT. § 604.01-.02. 
57. /d. § 1158.09. A potential problem in meshing MERLA and the Comparative 
Fault Act arises from the use of the word "solely" in the first sentence of § 1158.05, 
subd. 6, and the language of subd. 1 of § 604.0 I of the Minnesota Comparative Fault 
Act. Subdivision 6, clause (d) of § 1158.05 states that it is a defense to strict liability 
that the release was caused solely by an act or omission of the plaintiff. It could be 
interpreted by implication that if a plaintiff is found 90% liable and the defendant 
10%, the plaintiffs greater liability will not be a defense; a plaintiff 90% at fault is not 
solely liable. Section 604.0 I, subd. 1 of the Comparative Fault Act, however, says 
that a plaintiffs contributory fault shall bar recovery if the plaintiffs contributory 
fault is greater than the fault of the person against whom recovery is sought. Since 
§ 1158.05, subd. 6 is an explicit provision, it may control over the more general 
language of the Comparative Fault Act. 
The statutory remedy provided by § 1158.05 may be incorporated into the stric-
tures of the Comparative Fault Act. Section 604.01, subd. 1 essentially provides for 
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a situation where most of the persons responsible for a release 
are insolvent or unidentifiable, this provision will severely limit 
a plaintiffs recovery if the remaining solvent defendants bear a 
low percentage of fault. 
MERLA creates a strict, joint and several liability principle 
which is designed to make recovery easier for those injured by 
exposure to hazardous substances by eliminating the need to 
show that someone was at fault or negligent in causing the in-
jury or, where more than one person may have caused the in-
jury, by eliminating the need to show that the defendants acted 
jointly. 
b. Substances Covered 
One of the most difficult problems in devising a toxic tort 
strict liability compensation scheme is deciding which sub-
stances should give rise to liability. 58 The dangers associated 
with many of the chemicals in commerce are unknown. "New 
substances are continually produced and distributed, and new 
evidence frequently implicates as a potential hazard a sub-
stance previously thought to be safe."59 Additionally, sub-
stances which may not be dangerous alone may form a 
dangerous chemical compound when combined with other 
substances.6o 
Some hazardous substances are extremely toxic, capable of 
causing death even in small amounts. Other substances are 
much less toxic, likely to cause nothing more than a modest 
skin rash in most persons. Any substance can be more toxic to 
some people than to others due to varying degrees of suscepti-
bility among individuals. 
Deciding which substances should give rise to liability is ulti-
mately a question of policy. A special question arises regard-
ing substances not known to be harmful when disposed of in 
the comparison of a defendant's and a plaintiff's fault. Subdivision l(a) states that 
"fault" includes acts or omissions that subject a person to strict tort liability. Since 
§ 115B.05 subjects persons responsible for the release of hazardous substances to 
strict tort liability, it may be necessary to compare a plaintiff's and a defendant's fault 
under the Act in accordance with § 604.0 I, subd. I. 
58. Trauberman, supra' note 9, at 220 (most difficult aspect of administering a 
regulatory program). 
59. /d. (footnote omitted). 
60. Anderson, Hazardous Wastes: Supeifund Solution?, I WM. MITCHELL ENvrL. L.J. 
162, 166 (1983). 
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the past. There are a number of arguments for imposing liabil-
ity for injuries caused by these substances. These arguments 
include placing the cost of injury on the party best able to 
spread the risk ofloss, placing the loss on the party best able to 
prevent the creation of conditions giving rise to such injuries, 
and avoiding costly and confusing inquiries into complicated 
and speculative "state of the art" claims.61 It has also been 
argued that it is fair to impose liability on a party who does not 
know of latent risk in his conduct in those cases where the de-
fendant creates a disproportionate, excessive risk of harm rela-
tive to the victim's conduct.62 Of course, it can also be argued 
that liability should not be imposed on those who did not know 
that the substances they were handling were dangerous. Ac-
cording to this view, only those substances known at the time 
of their generation and use to be hazardous should give rise to 
liability. 
Although it is not entirely clear, MERLA seems to favor the 
former approach.63 It exposes responsible parties to liability 
for damages caused by the release of hazardous substances.64 
Hazardous substances include substances defined as hazardous 
under the federal Clean Water Act,65 the Clean Air Act,66 the 
61. Beshada v.Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 NJ. 191,205-09,447 A.2d 539, 
547-49 (1982); see also O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 NJ. 169, 179-80,463 A.2d 298, 
303 (1983) (allocation of risk upon manufacturers and others in stream of 
commerce). 
62. For an excellent discussion of the "reciprocal risk" notion and its application 
to a determination of tort liability, see Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 
HARV. L. REV. 537, 543-51 (1972). 
63. It is not clear whether MER LA fixes the category of substances which are 
"hazardous" for MERLA purposes as those substances which fall within the defini-
tion at the time of enactment, or whether the category expands or contracts as new 
substances are added to or deleted from the various federal and state law definitions 
to which MERLA refers. Any changes made in the definitions in the other laws to 
which MERLA refers would presumably be incorporated into MERLA as well. See 
MINN. STAT. § 645.31, subd. 2 (1984). Incorporation of the federal definitions, how-
ever, could be an unconstitutional delegation of state legislative authority, at least 
with respect to the tort law provisions which are not supplementary to or designed to 
achieve uniformity with a federal program. See Sheehy, Defenses and Limitations/or Sec-
tion 5 Claims Under MERLA in HAZARDOUS WASTE REGULATION AND LIABILITY 309, 
323-24 (Advanced Legal Education, Hamline University School of Law 1983). 
The legislative debate over foreseeability and the ultimate inclusion of a strict 
liability provision in the law certainly suggest that the legislature intended that sub-
stances not now known to be, but subsequently discovered to be, hazardous should 
fall within MERLA's coverage. 
64. MINN. STAT. § 115B.05, subd. I. 
65. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(2)(A) (1982). 
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Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,67 and under state 
law.68 Some of these substances were not known to be harmful 
when used or disposed of in the past. In addition, both the 
federal and state law definitions, including MERLA's defini-
tion, are open-ended. That is, they allow substances to be ad-
ded to or deleted from the list of those now defined as 
hazardous. 
Even with this open-ended approach, some harmful chemi-
cals may not fall within MERLA's definition. Persons injured 
by releases of such substances obviously will not have the rem-
edy that section 115B.05, subdivision 1 of MERLA provides. 
Though regulated for some purposes under MERLA,69 a "pol-
lutant or contaminant" is not defined as a hazardous sub-
stance.70 Pollutants or contaminants would include such 
things as sewage sludge and certain types of nuclear waste.71 
Natural and synthetic gases are not within the definition, nor is 
oil or any petroleum derivative, unless it has been defined or 
identified as a hazardous waste.72 In addition, some releases of 
potentially toxic substances, including pesticides and fertiliz-
ers, are not considered to be "releases"73 which give rise to 
liability under section 115B.05, subdivision 1. Finally, sub-
stances which may be hazardous under one major federal law, 
the Toxic Substances Control Act,74 are not within the MERLA 
definition unless they are coincidentally covered by one of the 
definitions which MERLA incorporates. While some sub-
stances subsequently discovered to be hazardous may be incor-
porated into MERLA's definition and subject to MERLA's 
provisions, other substances now known to be hazardous are 
excluded from MERLA's coverage. 
66. 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1982). 
67. [d. §§ 6903(5), 6921. 
68. See MINN. STAT. § 116.06, subd. 13 (hazardous waste defined). 
69. See, e.g., id. § 115B.17 (state response to releases of pollutants or contami-
nants). 
70. See id. § 1158.02, subd. 13. "There is no liability under this section for dam-
ages which result from the release of a pollutant or contaminant." [d. § 115B.05, 
subd. 2. 
71. See id. § 116.06, subd. 13. "Hazardous waste does not include source, special 
nuclear, or by-product material as defined by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended." [d. 
72. See id. § 1158.02, subd. 8. 
73. See id., subd. 15(a)-(d). 
74. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14). 
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c. Persons Responsible 
MERLA imposes its liability on "any person who is responsi-
ble for the release of a hazardous substance from a facility."75 
"Responsible persons" include owners or operators of facili-
ties where hazardous substances are located, those who ar-
range for the disposal or treatment of such substances, and 
certain transporters of these substances.76 Transporters are 
strictly liable only if they knew they were transporting a haz-
ardous substance, and selected the facility to which it was 
transported or disposed of it in a manner contrary to law.77 
Owners of land from which a release occurs are liable only in 
limited circumstances. It may be impossible to trace some haz-
ardous substances back to their manufacturers or transporters 
and some parties in the chain of responsibility may be insol-
vent. Thus, past and present owners of the land on which the 
release occurred may be the easiest persons to identify because 
their names are found in local land records. Under the com-
mon law, however, land ownership alone is not enough to cre-
ate liability; other factors are necessary to create liability for 
the landowner.7s According to the Second Restatement of 
Torts, a landowner who owned the land when the hazardous 
substance was located there is no longer liable once a subse-
quent purchaser of the land has discovered and abated the 
condition.79 Recent court decisions, however, have found an 
exception to this general rule where the previous owner acted 
affirmatively to create a dangerous situation or nuisance.so Ad-
ditionally, a subsequent purchaser of land is not liable until he 
has had a reasonable opportunity to discover the dangerous 
condition and abate it.8l Furthermore, recent cases have lim-
ited liability of subsequent landowners unless they have in 
some way accepted or ass.ociated themselves with the creation 
or maintenance of the conditions that gave rise to the hazard-
75. MINN. STAT. § 1I5B.05, subd. 1. 
76. Id. § 115B.03, subd. 1 (a)-(c). 
77. Id., subd. I(c). 
78. See 30I(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. 1, at 47. 
79. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 373(2), 840A(2) (1979), noted in 
30I(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. 1, at 47. 
80. See, e.g., New Jersey v. Exxon, 151 NJ. Super. 464, 376 A.2d 1339 (1977); 
Merrick v. Murphy, 83 Misc. 2d 39, 371 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1975). 
81. RESTATEMENT, supra note 79, §§ 366, 839, noted in 30I(e) REPORT, supra note 
4, pt. 1, at 48-49. 
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ous substance's release.82 Finally, because of the costs associ-
ated with abating the problems caused by the underground 
release of chemicals, courts are reluctant to impose liability on 
current owners.83 
MERLA provides that an owner of real property84 on which 
a hazardous substance was released is responsible ifhe is in the 
business of generating, transporting, storing, treating, or dis-
posing of hazardous substances or knowingly permitted others 
to engage in such a business on that property, or if he know-
ingly permitted any person to use the facility for disposal of a 
hazardous substance or regular disposal of waste. He is also 
responsible if he knew or reasonably should have known that a 
hazardous substance was located on the property at the time 
he bought it and engaged in conduct by which he associated 
himself with the release. In addition, ifhe significantly contrib-
uted to the release after he knew or reasonably should have 
known that a hazardous substance was located in or on the 
property, the landowner can be held responsible.85 
Under MERLA, past owners who allowed disposal of wastes 
on their land during their tenure will remain liable even after a 
subsequent purchaser has had a reasonable opportunity to dis-
cover and abate the hazardous condition. The property pur-
chasers, on the other hand, will not be held liable unless they 
affirmatively associated themselves in some way with the dispo-
sal or release. Operators of facilities will generally be respon-
sible for their releases as will transporters who knew they were 
handling hazardous substances and who chose the disposal 
site. 
d. Damages Recoverable 
Releases of hazardous substances may result in Injury to 
both persons and property. MERLA provides for recovery for 
both property loss and personal injury. Property loss includes 
82. See, e.g., Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp. v. Commonwealth, 35 Pa. 
Commw. 443,387 A.2d 142 (1978), affd, 489 Pa. 221,414 A.2d 37 (1980). 
83. 301(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. 2, at C-7. 
84. An "owner of real property" as defined by MERLA includes anyone who is in 
possession of or has the right to control the use of the property. MINN. STAT. 
§ 115B.0 I, subd. 11. Persons holding leases which are financing devices or persons 
holding nonpossessory interests are excluded. [d., subd. 11(1). 
85. [d. § 115B.03, subd. 3. It is not clear whether mere failure to remedy the 
hazardous condition upon discovery is to be considered "action which significantly 
contributed to the release." [d., subd. 3(e). 
HeinOnline -- 11 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 682 1985
682 WILLIAM MITCHELL LA W REVIEW [Vol. 11 
damage to or destruction of real or personal property, includ-
ing relocation costs, loss of use, and lost income or profits re-
sulting from damage to or destruction ofproperty.86 Personal 
injury losses include death, personal injury, or disease, includ-
ing medical expenses and rehabilitation costs, lost income or 
earning capacity, and pain and suffering.87 
Certain types of damages are not expressly recoverable 
under section 115B.05. These damages include increased risk 
of injury or disease, emotional distress, and medical surveil-
lance costS.88 Nevertheless, section 115B.12 preserves all pre-
existing legal remedies so that plaintiffs may argue that these 
sorts of damages are also recoverable89 at least to the extent 
the law previously would have allowed their recovery.90 
2. Limitations on Liability 
MERLA's strict liability principle does not impose absolute 
liability on hazardous waste generators and handlers.91 In-
stead, the Act places a number of limitations on its imposition 
of liability. Strong policy reasons dictated that hazardous sub-
86. Id. § 115B.05, subd. l(a). 
87. Id., subd. l(b). 
88. Payne, Section 5 Claims Under the Minnesota Environmental Response and Liability 
Act in HAZARDOUS WASTE REGULATION AND UABIUTY 285, 301 (Advanced Legal Edu-
cation, Hamline University School of Law 1983). 
89. The law allowed recovery for emotional distress as well as punitive damages 
in at least some circumstances. The law did not traditionally recognize increased risk 
of injury where there was no actual injury as a compensable event. Unless the plain-
tiff can show to a high degree of certainty that harm will occur in the future, there is 
little hope of recovery. Where there is no initial actual harm, the plaintiff must show 
that it is "highly probable" that harm will occur. See Seltzer, supra note 24, at 833. 
Nevertheless, scientists believe that mere exposure to hazardous substances can be a 
substantial harm in that such exposure can increase the risk of developing certain 
types of illness or disease in the future. The increased susceptibility to future injury 
is the harm. The process of evaluating the risks associated with exposure to a hazard-
ous substance, a process called risk assessment, is based on probability theory. 
Probability theory quantifies the likelihood that a particular exposure will increase a 
person's chance of developing a disease in the future. See id. at 817. Although some 
courts have modified the traditional approach to the concept of increased risk, see 
generally id. at 833-35, it is still unlikely that this type of harm is compensable under 
MERLA unless the plaintiff can show that the increased probability of future harm is 
very high. But see Espel, The Minnesota Environmental Response and Liability Act, at 39-40 
(1984) (to be published in an upcoming volume of the Natural Resources Journal) 
(discussion of the availability of damages not specifically listed in MERLA). 
90. Cj Espel, supra note 89, at 39-40 (on the availability of damages not specifi-
cally listed in MERLA). 
91. See Note, Strict Liability for Generators, Transporters, and Disposers of Hazardous 
Wastes, 64 MINN. L. REV. 949, 976 (1980). 
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stance generators should internalize the costs of producing 
such substances, but it could not be forgotten that a genera-
tor's actual causal relationship with the release may be attenu-
ated. Such persons could not reasonably be required to pay 
damages for releases that are wholly and directly caused by 
outside factors. Other policies suggested further limitations 
on liability. Some of these limits are incorporated into 
MERLA in the form of defenses to liability. Thus, plaintiffs 
may be denied recovery under MERLA because of one or more 
defenses.92 In addition, policy reasons may dictate that a cap 
be placed on the amount of damages recoverable against cer-
tain parties. MERLA contains a number of these limitations as 
well.93 
a. In General 
MERLA establishes a number of defenses to its strict liability 
cause of action in section 115B.05, subdivision I. Certain re-
leases of hazardous substances will not give rise to liability 
under section 115B.05. "It is a defense to liability under this 
section that the release. . . was caused solely by: (a) An act of 
God; (b) An act of war; (c) An act of vandalism or sabotage; or 
(d) An act or omission of a third party or the plaintiff. "94 
There are also limitations placed on the use of these de-
fenses. First, acts of God do not include those phenomena the 
effects of which could have been prevented or avoided by the 
exercise of due care or foresight by the defendant.95 Second, 
"third party, for the purposes of clause (d) does not include an 
employee or agent of the defendant, or a person in the chain of 
responsibility for the [release] of the hazardous substance."96 
Finally, "The defenses provided in clauses (c) and (d) apply 
only if the defendant establishes that he exercised due care 
with respect to the hazardous substance concerned . . . . "97 
Section 115B.05 provides a few other defenses when there 
92. MINN. STAT. § 1158.05, subds. 2-10; see also Note, supra note 91, at 976. 
93. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. 
94. MINN. STAT. § 1158.05, subd. 6(a), (b). 
95. See id. § 1158.02, subd. 2. An act of God is defined as "an unanticipated 
grave natural disaster or other natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable, 
and irresistible character, the effects of which could not have been prevented or 
avoided by the exercise of due care or foresight." ld. 
96. ld. § 1158.05, subd. 6. 
97. ld. 
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are no intervening acts: (1) once a hazardous substance has 
been relocated in a different facility due to the intervening acts 
of a public agency, those persons responsible for the release of 
the substance from the old location are not responsible for any 
release of it from the new location; (2) responsible persons are 
relieved from liability for releases sanctioned by state or fed-
eral permits and standards; and (3) responsible persons are 
not liable if they cause releases while assisting public agencies 
in cleaning up or attempting to prevent releases of hazardous 
substances.98 Finally, an employee's claim against his em-
ployer is limited to recovery under the workers' compensation 
law if the claim is compensable under that law as an injury or 
disease arising out of or in the course of employment.99 
b. Political Subdivisions 
A political subdivision might be held liable under MERLA if, 
for example, it operated a hazardous waste disposal facility or 
if it owned land and acquiesced in the deposit of hazardous 
substances on the land. In addition, a subdivision's liability 
may result from its activities and obligations in supervising the 
disposal of hazardous wastes.IOO The liability of political sub-
divisions in Minnesota is generally limited under the provi-
sions of the Municipal Tort Liability ACt. lOi These limits are 
liberalized somewhat when claims arise out of a ·release of haz-
ardous substances. Io2 
c. Statute of Limitations 
MERLA establishes a six-year statute of limitations 103 which 
requires a party to resolve his dispute while the evidence is still 
intact and witnesses' memories are still fresh. 104 The statute is 
designed to assure the fair and effective administration of jus-
tice in a timely fashion. 105 In the case of toxic torts, however, 
the desire to settle disputes in a timely fashion may be out-
98. Id., subds. 7-9. 
99. Id., subd. 3. 
100. Cf Anderson, supra note 60, at 169 (states the same proposition with respect 
to the activities of the United States government). 
101. MINN. STAT. § 115B.05, subd. 4. 
102. Id. § 446.01-.15. 
103. Id. § 115B.l1. 
104. Anderson, supra note 60, at 165. 
105. Dalton v. Dow Chern. Co., 280 Minn. 147, 153 n.2, 158 N.W.2d 580, 584 n.2 
(1968). 
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weighed by the policy of affording the plaintiff a fair opportu-
nity to vindicate his rights. 106 Because injuries caused by toxic 
torts have long latency periods, a plaintiff may suffer great 
hardship if his right to bring a claim is cut off prematurely. 107 
The degree to which a statute of limitations becomes a bar to 
recovery depends on when the time limit set forth in the stat,. 
ute begins to run. lOS 
For determining when its statute of limitations begins to 
run, Minnesota has adopted the "discovery rule." In Dalton v. 
Dow Chemical CO.,109 the court held that the statute of limita-
tions for negligence actions does not begin to run until dam-
age has resulted from the alleged negligence. l1o Personal 
injury damages do not "result" until physical impairment 
manifests itself. lll This means that the time limit does not be-
gin to run until the plaintiff should reasonably have discovered 
his injury or disease. 
MERLA's statute of limitations does not specify a single 
event that begins the running of the statute, but instead lists 
certain factors that courts must consider. These include: 
"(a) When the plaintiff discovered the injury or loss; 
(b) Whether a personal injury or disease had sufficiently mani-
fested itself; and (c) When the plaintiff discovered, or using 
due diligence should have discovered, a causal connection be-
tween the injury, disease, or loss and the release of a hazard-
ous substance."112 The inclusion of this last factor indicates 
that courts should take a liberal view of when a person might 
106. 301(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. 2, at B-1. 
107. See id., at B-2. 
108. Trauberman, supra note 9, at 217. 
109. 280 Minn. 147,158 N.W.2d 580 (1968) (involving personal injuries resulting 
from exposure to cleaning solvent produced by defendant); see also 301 (e) REPORT, 
supra note 4, pt. 2, at B-4, B-25. 
110. [d. at 153, 158 N.W.2d at 584. 
Ill. Fink v. Cold Spring Granite Co., 262 Minn. 393, 405, 115 N.W.2d 22, 30 
(1962), quoted in Dalton, 280 Minn. at 152, 158 N.W.2d at 584 (stating that the work-
ers' compensation statute "does not commence to run against the victim until he has 
'contracted' the disease and the process of contracting the disease does not cease 
until physical impairment manifests itself'). 
112. MINN. STAT. § 115B.l1. It is not clear whether a personal injury claim which 
arises under MERLA but which was "discovered" more than six years before the 
enactment of the Act is barred by MERLA's statute oflimitations. In Calder v. City of 
Crystal, 318 N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 1982), the court indicated that it would be unconsti-
tutional for the legislature to pass a statute creating a substantive remedy but to make 
that remedy meaningless by barring access to it with a statute of limitations. [d. at 
844. 
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reasonably "discover" an injury or loss that can become the 
basis of a claim under MERLA. 
d. Other Time Limits: The "Retroactivity" Limits 
MERLA contains additional limits affecting the availability of 
section 115B.05's strict liability action. First, section 115B.15 
provides that no claim may be made if the release causing the 
loss occurred wholly before July 1, 1983. Apparently the plain-
tiff bears the burden of proving that his loss resulted from a 
release occurring on or after this date.ll!l 
Section 115B.06 also provides that if the hazardous sub-
stance "was placed or came to be located in or on the facility 
[from which the release occurred] wholly before January 1, 
1960," then no claim may be made under section 115B.05}14 
This provision appears to be an affirmative defense, so that a 
defendant would have the burden of proving that his deposits 
of substances at the facility occurred wholly before January 1, 
1960. 
Finally, if the hazardous substance "was placed or came to 
be located in or on the facility wholly before January 1, 1973," 
all persons responsible for the release have a defense against 
the action "if the defendant shows" that the substance was 
placed at the facility wholly before this date and "that the activ-
ity by which the substance was kept, placed, or came to be lo-
cated in or on the facility was not an abnormally dangerous 
activity."1l5 The burden of proving both these factors is on 
113. It is obvious that the person who deposits a hazardous substance at a facility 
(the defendant) is generally more likely to have the evidence regarding when that 
occurred than is a person injured by release of that substance (the plaintiff). 
Although not as clear, it seems that the defendant is also more likely to have the 
evidence regarding when a release occurs (especially if he is the transporter or facility 
operator) than is the plaintiff. Since the major factor in determining where to place 
the burden of proof on any issue is determining which party is more likely to be in 
possession of the best evidence, MERLA correctly puts the burden of proving when 
the deposit occurred on the defendant. See MINN. STAT. § 115B.06. That same con-
sideration indicates that the burden of proving when the release occurred should also 
be on the defendant, but this is not expressly stated in § 115B.15. 
114. See id. § 115B.06, subd. I(b). 
liS. See id., subds. I(a), 2. Note that this section allows all defendants responsible 
for releases of substances that came to be located in or on facilities between the years 
1960-1973 to escape liability under § 115B.05 if they can show that the manner in 
which the substance was handled was not "abnormally dangerous". "Abnormally 
dangerous" is a term taken from § 520 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Sec-
tion 520 sets up a multifactor test for determining whether a particular activity may 
be deemed "abnormally dangerous". RESTATEMENT, supra note 79, § 520. 
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the defendant. 
These provisions of MERLA are, in effect, a statute of re-
pose.11 6 Statutes of repose are a byproduct of the develop-
ment of strict products liability law. Such statutes designate a 
period of time, following the manufacture or sale of a product 
or, in MERLA's case, following the deposit of substances at a 
facility, after which a strict liability action is prohibited. I 17 The 
policy reasons advanced for the introduction of statutes of re-
pose focus on the benefits of encouraging progress in the 
processing of claims, eliminating potential abuses from old 
claims, and creating certainty. I 18 
The distinction between a statute of repose and a statute of 
limitations can be seen by the following example: A hazardous 
substance is deposited at a facility in 1959. A release began in 
1970 and continues today. The plaintiff discovers an injury 
caused by this release and the causal relationship between his 
injury and the release in 1980. The plaintiff would not be pre-
vented from bringing a claim by the six-year statute of limita-
tions which began upon discovery in 1980. According to the 
statute of repose, however, he would not be able to success-
fully sustain the claim if the defendant showed that the deposit 
was made prior to 1960. 
Section 115B.06 is intended to moderate the "retroactivity" 
of section 115B.05, which imposes liability on those who gen-
erated and transported waste before the Act's passage. Sec-
tion 115B.15, which limits the applicability of section 
115B.05's strict liability to releases occurring after the Act's ef-
fective date, also limits the Act's retroactivity. 
In sum, the strict, joint and several liability rule of section 
115B.05 is limited in its effect. Some provisions preclude lia-
bility altogether for certain acts. Others limit liability when a 
political subdivision is the defendant. Finally, a statute of limi-
116. "Although the term 'statute of repose' has traditionally been used to encom-
pass statutes of limitation, in recent years it has been used to distinguish ordinary 
statutes of limitation from those that begin 'to run at a time unrelated to the tradi-
tional accrual of the cause of action.''' Bolick v. American Barmag Corp., 306 N.C. 
364,367-68,293 S.E.2d 415, 417-18 (1982) (quoting McGovern, The Variety, Policy 
and Constitutionality of Product Liability Statutes of Repose, 30 AM. V.L. REV. 579, 584 
(1981». 
117. Anderson, supra note 60, at 165. 
118. See McGovern, supra note 116, at 588 (analyzing public policy of product lia-
bility statutes of repose). 
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tations requires a plaintiff to make his claim within six years of 
discovering the fact of his injury and its cause. 
3. Proof of Causation 
There are two major problems faced by those injured as a 
result of exposure to hazardous substances. First, they must 
demonstrate that their injury or loss was caused or significantly 
contributed to by exposure to a hazardous substance. Second, 
they must prove that the defendant is responsible for the sub-
stance causing the injury. 
a. Proving That a Hazardous Substance Caused the Injury 
In a toxic tort case, the plaintiff must demonstrate a causal 
connection between the loss or injury complained of and the 
environmental condition for which the defendant is allegedly 
responsible. II9 Even if it can be demonstrated that a person's 
injury or loss is caused by exposure to a hazardous substance, 
he must also show that a particular exposure is the one which 
significantly contributed to his injury. The long latency period 
associated with injuries from hazardous substance exposure 
complicates this problem. I20 Epidemiological studies indicate 
that cancer, for example, may take fifteen to twenty years to 
develop. 121 
During the latency period the plaintiff may have moved to 
different locations, and may have exposed himself to a number 
of environmental hazards or toxic substances. 122 As a result, 
his injury may have no single cause. 123 Many chronic diseases 
result from multifactorial etiology-several factors interacting 
at the same time in complex ways to produce harm.I24 The 
119. 301(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. 1, at 70. 
120. See id. 
121. Seltzer, supra note 24, at 811. An individual may lead a normal, healthy life 
for years without any apparent symptoms and then suddenly experience visible ef-
fects from the chemical exposure. Id. (citing S. EpSTEIN, THE POLITICS OF CANCER 2 
(1978». 
122. 301(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. I, at 70. 
123. Seltzer, supra note 24, at 811 (citing DIVISION OF LABORATORIES AND EPIDEMI-
OLOGY, NEW JERSEY STATE DEPT. OF HEALTH, AN EPIDEMIOLOGIC INVESTIGATION OF 
CLUSTERS OF LEUKEMIA AND HODGKINS DISEASE IN RUTHERFORD, NEW JERSEY 17 
(1979». 
124. Trauberman, supra note 9, at 199; see also Seltzer, supra note 24, at 811-12 ("at 
each stage of a chemical's migratory pathway to the victim ... chemical transforma-
tion, dilution, and recombination with other new compounds may occur"). 
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victim may be exposed to a wide variety of contaminants, 
preventing the identification of a single "responsible" sub-
stance. This becomes even more problematic in cases where a 
person's health may be affected by factors other than the expo-
sure to a substance at a particular location. These factors may 
include "diet, smoking, genetic predispositions, age, and prior 
exposure to chemicals."125 . 
Not all persons exposed to hazardous substances will con-
tract disease. At present, there is no empirical method that can 
accurately predict which persons exposed to hazardous sub-
stances will develop diseases or other injuries. Moreover, 
scientists have been unable to determine an absolutely safe 
level of human exposure to hazardous substances. 126 
The problems of demonstrating cause and effect do not 
bode well for a plaintiff seeking to recover damages in a court 
of law. Both the common law and MERLA firmly place the 
burden of proving legal causation on the plaintiff. 127 To prove 
legal causation, the plaintiff must show, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that it is more probable than not that the defend-
ant's conduct was a "substantial factor in causing the alleged 
injury."128 The causal connection between the defendant's re-
lease and the plaintiffs injury cannot be proven by showing "a 
'mere possibility' of causation, even though such showing is 
scientifically supportable."129 Nor can it be met by showing 
that exposure to the hazardous substance increases the risk of 
125. Seltzer, supra note 24, at 812. 
126. /d. at 810. 
127. [d. at 821. 
128. [d.; see Flom v. Flom, 291 N.W.2d 914, 917 (Minn. 1980) ("proximate cause 
exists if negligence was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury"); see also 
Waite v. American Creosote Works, Inc., 295 Minn. 288, 291, 204 N.W.2d 410,412 
(1973) (in a strict products liability case a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence that a defect caused the injury). 
Case law provides examples of toxic tort plaintiffs unable to meet their burden of 
proof. See, e.g., Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Williams, 222 Miss. 538, 76 So. 2d 365 
(1954) (failure to prove direction taken by contaminants in the ground and between 
origin of contaminant and injury); Schlitchkrull v. Mellon-Pollock Oil Co., 301 Pa. 
560,152 A. 832 (1930) (failure to prove one of several chemicals caused the disease). 
See generally Whitehead & Christenson, Common Law Defenses in Hazardous Waste and 
Toxic Tort Cases after MERLA in HAZARDOUS WASTE REGULATION AND LIABILITY 261, 
264-66 (Advanced Legal Education, Hamline University School of Law 1983). 
129. Seltzer, supra note 24, at 821-22; see PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 55, § 41. 
According to Prosser and Keeton, "As a practical matter, legal responsibility must be 
limited to those causes which are so closely connected with the result and of such 
significance that the law is justified in imposing liability." [d. at 264. 
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harm in the future.l 3o 
Proof of causation in a hazardous substance personal injury 
case often requires large amounts of sophisticated, expensive 
medical and scientific evidence to demonstrate the causal con-
nection between a disease and an environmental exposure. 131 
Evidence may be required which shows that the kind of expo-
sure, its duration or frequency, and its intensity could add to 
or produce the kind of disease or injury suffered by the plain-
tiff.132 Even with the best possible evidence, however, "most 
plaintiffs can only show that it is statistically probable that the 
exposure caused his injury."133 A toxicologist appearing as an 
expert witness for the plaintiff may be able to state with assur-
ance that exposure to a particular level of the hazardous sub-
stance is capable of causing an increase of disease in the 
exposed population. That witness, however, may not be able 
to testify that the individual plaintiff's disease was, more proba-
bly than not, caused by exposure to a particular hazardous sub-
stance release. 134 
MERLA attempts to mitigate the problems of demonstrating 
causal connection in claims for death, personal injury, or dis-
ease. Minnesota Statutes section 115B.07 states that a "court 
may not direct a verdict against the plaintiff on the issue of 
causation if the plaintiff produces evidence sufficient to enable 
a reasonable person to find that: 
(a) the defendant is a person who is responsible for the 
release; 
(b) the plaintiff was exposed to the hazardous substance; 
130. Seltzer, supra note 24, at 822; Hamil v. Bashline, 243 Pa. Super. 227, 233-35, 
364 A.2d 1366, 1369-70 (1976) (to meet causation requirement, conduct which in-
creased risk of harm must also have caused harm). 
To prove a causal link between the agents released from the hazardous 
waste site and the injury at issue, the plaintiff must fulfill four essential con-
ditions of the traditional approach to legal causation. First, the plaintiff 
must substantiate the presence of significant amounts of the pollutant which 
is alleged to have caused the injury. Second, the plaintiff must reconstruct 
the manner in which the exposure occurred by tracing the path of contami-
nant migration from the waste site to the victim. Third, the plaintiff must 
identify the source of the contamination and show a breach of due care by 
the defendant. Fourth, the plaintiff must demonstrate the effect of the pol-
lutant in question on the injured person. 
Seltzer, supra note 24, at 821-22. 
131. 301(e} REPORT, supra note 4, pt. I, at 70-71. 
132. See id. 
133. Anderson, supra note 60, at 168. 
134. Trauberman, supra note 9, at 200. 
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(c) the release could reasonably have resulted in plaintiff's 
exposure to the substance in the amount and duration 
experienced by the plaintiff; and 
(d) the death, injury, or disease suffered by the plaintiff is 
caused or significantly contributed to by exposure to 
the hazardous substance in an amount and duration ex~ 
perienced by the plaintiff. 135 
691 
Cumulatively, clauses (a) through (d) amount to a substan~ 
tial factor test. Clause (d) for instance, requires that the injury 
suffered by the plaintiff must be caused or significantly contrib~ 
uted to by exposure to the hazardous substance. The words 
"significantly contributed to" seem to be equivalent to a sub-
stantial factor test. In addition, section 115B.07 states: "Noth-
ing in this section shall be construed to relieve the plaintiff of 
the burden of proving. . . the causal connection between the 
release of the hazardous substance ... and the plaintiffs 
death, injury, or disease."136 Note, however, that clause (d) 
says that the plaintiff need only show that his injury is signifi-
cantly contributed to by exposure to the hazardous substance 
in an amount and duration experienced by the plaintiff, not 
that his exposure to the substance caused his injury. 
Both the legislative debates on section 115B.07 and the fact 
that it is included in the Act indicate that the legislature in-
tended to change some part of the common law on causation 
rather than simply codify it. Moreover, the apparent purpose 
of the change was to make it less difficult for injured persons to 
get over the causation hurdle. Until courts begin to construe 
and apply this section, it remains to be seen whether section 
115B.07 achieves this purpose. 
It is likely that this language will have no practical effect on 
the type of evidence considered on the causation issue or on 
the way courts instruct the trier of fact to assess that evidence. 
If the plaintiff produces sufficient evidence to enable a reason-
able person to find the four factors listed in clauses (a) through 
(d), however, the court cannot direct a verdict against the 
plaintiff for failure to present enough evidence to sustain a 
showing of a causal connection. Even without this language in 
MERLA, it seems very unlikely that a court would direct a ver-
dict against a plaintiff who had made the showings listed in 
135. MINN. STAT. § 1158.07. 
136. Id. 
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clauses (a) through (d), but would instead let the evidence go 
to the trier of fact. This provision in MERLA is therefore un-
likely to mitigate the problems of demonstrating causal con-
nection in cases of this kind, and proving causation remains a 
major roadblock to a plaintiffs success in this type of case. 
Section 115B.07 also states, "Evidence to a reasonable med-
ical certainty that exposure to the hazardous substance caused 
or significantly contributed to the death, injury or disease is 
not required for the issue of causation to be submitted to the 
trier of fact."137 This provision is not a significant departure 
from the common law position in Minnesota, but this language 
at least makes it clear that no such requirement exists. 138 
137. /d. 
138. In cases of chemically induced diseases, it is often impossible for medical 
experts to testify with certainty that a particular disease resulted from a specific 
chemical. Nevertheless, evidence sufficient to establish legal causation will be pres-
ent if a plaintiff can show that the disease more likely than not resulted from the 
exposure. 
The difference between medical and legal causation is illustrated by Daly v. 
Bergstedt, 267 Minn. 244, 126 N.W.2d 242 (1964). In Daly, six physicians testified 
that there was no causal connection between a bruise to the plaintiffs breast and her 
breast cancer, while one doctor expressed the opinion that the cancer could develop 
from the bruise. The case was allowed to go to the jury, which found for the plaintiff. 
The defendants claimed that there was no factual basis in the record to establish a 
causal connection between the injury and the disease. The supreme court said: 
The point raised by [defendants] is not new. It arises because of the 
difference in the medical and legal approach to the question of causation. 
In the case before us, it seems that [defendants] refused to recognize that 
legal determination for responsibility may differ from medical findings as to the cause or 
source of a disease. 
Id. at 249, 126 N.W.2d at 246 (emphasis added). 
The Daly court held that the record was sufficient to present the question of 
causation to the jury. The court rejected the defendants' claim that it could not be 
medically established that a single trauma can cause cancer, and held that legal cause 
had been established. The court further noted that inferences could be drawn from 
the chain of events from the time of the accident to the time when the cancer devel-
oped, and that such inferences, "if rational and natural, which follow from a se-
quence of proved events, may be sufficient to establish causal connection without any 
supporting medical testimony." /d. at 250, 126 N.W.2d at 247. 
The court also rejected defendants' contention that the verdict should be over-
turned because the proof was uncertain and speculative. In fact, there was no testi-
mony which had been presented "to a medical certainty." The court quoted from its 
earlier decision in Weller v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 239 Minn. 298, 303, 58 N.W.2d 
739, 742 (1953) as follows: 
It is well settled that a medical expert's opinion need not be free from 
doubt or capable of demonstration. It is only necessary that it be in his 
judgment true. . . . The use of the words 'the most likely diagnosis' does 
not make the testimony speculative or conjectural but merely indicates the 
problem of all experts that although the opinion be based upon tests and 
methods recognized and prescribed by the medical profession, nevertheless 
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b. Proving Responsibility for an Injury-Causing Hazardous 
Substance 
693 
Once a person has demonstrated that his injury or loss is 
caused by a particular release, he must show that the defendant 
is responsible for that release. Under MERLA, establishing re-
sponsibility may be relatively simple in some cases. In other 
cases, for example those involving generators and transporters 
of the hazardous substance,l39 proof of responsibility may be a 
more painstaking task. 140 Proof of responsibility in these cases 
would require demonstrating that the released substance was 
transported to the facility by the transporter and originally 
generated by the generator. 
Once a site is identified as the facility from which the release 
occurred, analyzing its contents presents barriers because of 
the sampling process. Because there is danger of aggravating 
a substance release during sampling, only a limited number of 
samples can be taken. These samples may not reflect the con-
tents of the entire site, and may not always prove accurate.l41 
In addition, the site may contain substances generated by a 
number of firms. These firms may have hired a number of dif-
ferent companies to transport their chemicals to the facility. 
As a result, the substances described at the facility may never 
be traced back to the firms that generated or transported them. 
Sites may have been abandoned, with no record of companies 
responsible for the wastes deposited there. At other sites, 
there may have been inadequate recording of deposits. 
Normally, the plaintiff has the burden of proving causation 
by a preponderance of the evidence.l42 This can be difficult 
there is always the possibility of error .... Where there is such a difference 
of opinion and where the opinion of a reputable medical expert is submitted 
that in plaintiffs case the trauma which resulted from the accident was a 
precipitating factor in bringing on the condition, the causal relationship be-
tween the accident and the disease described becomes one for the jury's 
determination. 
Daly, 267 Minn. at 251, 126 N.W.2d at 247 (quoting Weller, 239 Minn. at 303, 58 
N.W.2d at 742). 
139. See MINN. STAT. § 115B.03., subd. l(b), (c). 
140. Cj. Barsky, Abandoning Federal Sovereign Immunity: Public Compensation for Victims 
of Latently Defective Therapeutic Drugs, 2 J. PROD. L. 20, 32-34 (1983) (discussing diffi-
culty of identifying drug manufacturers). 
141. See Zazzali & Grad, Hazardous Wastes: New Rights and Remedies?, 13 SETON HALL 
L. RE~44~452 (198~. 
142. See Hall, The Problem of Unending Liability for Hazardous Waste Management, 38 
Bus. LAw. 593,610 (1983). 
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when there are many possible defendants and the problem is 
showing which one of them is responsible for the release that 
actually caused the plaintiff's harm. Some courts have begun 
to respond to this problem by easing or shifting the plaintiff's 
burden of apportionment and proof "by the use of presump-
tions or other legal mechanisms based upon what they per-
ceive to be 'fair.' "143 Several theories have been advanced, 
including concert of action, alternative liability, enterprise lia-
bility, and market share liability}44 These theories shift the 
burden of apportionment or proof to the defendants if the 
plaintiff has established a cause of action against each of them 
but is unable to show the relative degree of responsibility 
among them or a causal relation between his injury and a spe-
cific defendant. 145 The theories vary in three important as-
pects: whether they shift the burden of apportionment or 
proof,146 whether all possible defendants must be joined, and 
the degree to which defendants must have acted in concert or 
agreement. 147 
Under the concert of action theory, a defendant is liable ifhe 
143. /d. 
144. Id. 
145. 301(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. 1, at 55. 
146. The concept of shifting the burden of apportionment and the concept of 
joint and several liability have been muddled by commentators. See, e.g., id. at 54. 
J oint and several liability is merely the result of shifting the burden of apportionment 
from the plaintiff to the defendant. The theories noted in the text ease the plaintiff's 
proof problems and allow such burden-shifting to occur. In addition, the concept of 
shifting the burden of apportionment should be distinguished from the concept of 
shifting the burden of proof. Shifting the burden of apportionment allows the plain-
tiff to establish liability against each defendant, without having to prove how much at 
fault each defendant was. The shifting of the burden of proof, if it does occur, will 
happen before the shifting of apportionment or the finding of joint and severalliabil-
ity. Once the plaintiff has established facts which allow the shifting of the burden of 
proof, it is incumbent upon the defendant to prove that his actions were not respon-
sible for the plaintiff's injury. If the defendant fails in this attempt, joint and several 
liability will be established and he will have the burden of apportioning responsibility 
between himself and his co-tortfeasors. 
147. See id. at 55. Most of the cases that have employed these theories involve 
diethystilbestorol (DES). DES is a synthetic estrogen which was prescribed for 1.5 to 
3 million pregnant women from 1947 to 1971, and has been linked to cancer in the 
daughters of the mothers who ingested the drug. Id. pt. 2, at C-19. There are 
enough similarities between DES and toxic tort cases to make the DES cases analo-
gous authority. See id. In both, the injury does not appear until a significant length of 
time has passed. Causation problems appear in both types of cases since physiologi-
cal disorders are impossible to trace with complete certainty. Finally, the identifica-
tion of defendants is difficult in both types of cases due to lapse of time and loss or 
disposal of records. See id. pt. 2, at C-19, C-20. 
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harms the plaintiff while committing a tortious act in concert 
with others or pursuant to a common design. 148 Alternative 
liability, unlike concert of action, allows a plaintiff to shift the 
burden of proof to several independently acting tortfeasors. 149 
148. Id. pt. I, at 56; see RESTATEMENT, supra note 79, § 876(a). Parties act in con-
cert when they act in accordance with an agreement to cooperate in a particular line 
of conduct or to accomplish a particular result. Id. § 876(a) comment on clause (a). 
The agreement need not be express; it may be implied and understood to exist from 
the conduct itself. Id. A concert of action under these circumstances is a true joint 
tort, and once the fact of a tortfeasor's liability is established he is jointly and sever-
ally liable for the entire award. Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 73, 289 
N.W.2d 20, 25 (1979). 
The concert of action theory found favor with courts in at least two DES cases. 
See Abel, 94 Mich. App. at 72-73, 289 N.W.2d at 24-25; Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 79 
A.D.2d 317,436 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1981). The Abel court held that plaintiffs bare allega-
tion in her pleadings that various drug manufacturing firms had engaged in tortious 
concerted action through the marketing of DES was sufficient to withstand a motion 
for summary judgment. Abel, 94 Mich. App. at 72, 289 N.W.2d at 25. The Bichler 
court held that the evidence supported a jury finding that the drug manufacturer had 
engaged in concerted actions with other drug manufacturers. Bichler, 79 A.D.2d at 
330,436 N.Y.S.2d at 633. The court pointed to the manufacturers' pooling of in for-
mation, agreement on the same basic chemical formula, and the adoption of the de-
fendant's literature as a model for package inserts for joint submission to the FDA. 
See id. 
One problem associated with applying the concert of action theory to strict lia-
bility cases is the requirement that there be acts of a tortious character in carrying the 
common design or plan into execution. See Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 
1004, 1015 (D.S.C. 1981); RESTATEMENT, supra note 79, § 876(a) comment on clause 
(b). The requirement of "tortious character" is most easily satisfied when the case 
involves an intentional or negligent tort. Cases involving strict liability present a 
problem. The Restatement, in fact, takes no position on whether the concert of ac-
tion theory is applicable to actions involving strict liability. RESTATEMENT, supra note 
79, § 876 caveat. The Bichler court solved this problem by applying the concert of 
action theory to non-negligent collective action on the part of a manufacturer. See 
Bichler, 79 A.D.2d at 328-30, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 632-33. Its justification for doing so 
was that passage of time and industry practice had resulted in the plaintiff being un-
able to identify the specific manufacturer responsible for her injury. Id. at 328-29, 
436 N.Y.S.2d at 632. Other courts have not followed this approach. In Lyons v. Premo 
Pharmaceutical Labs, Inc., the Supreme Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, stated 
that "[t]he purpose of [concert of action] is not so much to solve problems ofidentifi-
cation as to deter anti-social behavior." 170 NJ. Super. 183, 193,406 A.2d 185, 190 
(1979). 
Another problem is that the theory may not apply if the plaintiff fails to establish 
the existence of an express or tacit agreement or a common plan among manufactur-
ers. Parallel action alone may not suffice. See Ryan, 514 F. Supp. at 1016. Conse-
quently, the concert of action theory may be difficult to apply in hazardous waste 
cases. There are more manufacturers and less interaction in the chemical disposal 
industry than there are in the drug industry. This makes it hard to prove the tacit 
understanding necessary for concert of action. See 30 I (e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. 2, 
at C-22, C-23. 
149. See id. at C-23. 
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Its elements are: (1) tortious conduct on the part of two or 
more actors; (2) harm caused to the plaintiff by at least one of 
them; and (3) uncertainty as to which one has caused the 
harm.I5o 
Enterprise liability combines features of the alternative lia-
bility and concert of action theories. 15I It applies where multi-
ple defendants exercise actual collective control over a 
150. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 79, § 433B(3). The case that established alter-
native liability as a viable theory of tort law was Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 
P.2d 1 (1948). The Restatement provides a concise summary of the facts in Summers: 
A and B, independently hunting quail, both negligently shoot at the same 
time in the direction of C.- C is struck in the face by a single shot, which 
could have come from either gun. In C's action against A and B, each of the 
defendants has the burden of proving that the shot did not come from his 
gun, and if he does not do so is subject to liability for the harm to C. 
RESTATEMENT, supra note 79, § 433B(3) illustration 9. The purpose of the theory is to 
prevent proven wrongdoers, some or all of whom have inflicted an iJ1iury upon an 
innocent plaintiff, to escape liability merely because the nature of their conduct has 
made it impossible or difficult to prove which one of them has caused the harm. 
RESTATEMENT, supra note 79, § 433B(3) comment on subsection (3)f 
In Abel u. Eli Lilly & Co., the court held that the facts of the case were in conform-
ity with the requirements of the alternative liability theory. See 94 Mich. App. at 76-
77, 289 N. W .2d at 26. The plaintiff alleged that all defendants had acted wrongfully 
in producing and manufacturing a defective product (DES), and that each plaintiff 
was injured by the product of one or the other defendant. See id. at 71, 289 N.W.2d 
at 24. The plaintiffs' complaint also alleged that all the defendants named consti-
tuted all of the known manufacturers of DES whose products were distributed in 
Michigan during the relevant time period. /d. at 67, 289 N.W.2d at 22. 
The main roadblock to recovery under alternative liability is the requirement 
that the harm must have resulted from the conduct of some one of the defendants. 
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 79, § 433B(3) comment 9. In Sind ell v. Abbott Labora-
tories, 26 Cal. 3d 588,602-03,607 P.2d 924, 931, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 139 (1980), 
five companies had been joined as defendants, out of approximately 200 drug com-
panies which make DES, any of which might have manufactured the injury-producing 
drug. The court noted that the possibility that any of the five defendants supplied 
the DES to plaintiff's mother was so remote that it would be unfair to require each 
defendant to exonerate itself. /d. . 
Sindell demonstrates the limits of the use of alternative liability in the case of 
hazardous waste releases. The plaintiff would have to join either all the generators 
and transporters who dumped chemicals at the facility or all the generators who man-
ufacture toxic chemicals. In addition, he would have to show that all acted tortiously 
in some respect. If one of the polluters has gone out of business, alternative liability 
would not be applied. 301(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. 2, at C-26. The Restatement 
recognizes the possibility that the requirement of joining all possible defendants 
might be modified due to the fact that one of the actors involved is not or cannot be 
joined as a defendant, or because of the effect ofJapse of time, or because of subs tan-
tial differences in the conduct of the actors or the risks which they have created. 
RESTATEMENT, supra note 79, § 433B(3) comment on subsection (3)11. 
151. 301 (e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. 2, at C-29. 
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particular risk-creating product or activity.152 The plaintiff 
must prove defendants' joint awareness of the risks and their 
joint capacity to reduce or affect those risks. 15s 
Market share liability is a modification of the alternative lia-
152. Hall v. E.!. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 376 (E.D.N.Y. 
1972). 
153. [d. at 378. Joint control can be shown in one of three ways: (1) plaintiffs 
could prove the existence of an explicit agreement and joint action among the de-
fendants, i.e., concert of action; (2) plaintiffs could submit evidence of defendants' 
parallel behavior sufficient to support an inference of tacit agreement or cooperation; 
or (3) plaintiffs could submit evidence that defendants, acting independently, ad-
hered to an industry-wide standard or custom. See id. at 373-74; see also 301(e) RE-
PORT, supra note 4, pt. 2, at C-29 to C-30. Where such standards or practices exist, 
the industry operates as a single enterprise by stabilizing the production costs of 
safety features and establishing an industry-wide custom which influences the appli-
cable standard of care. Hall, 345 F. Supp. at 374. 
In order to set up a prima facie case of enterprise liability, plaintiffs must first 
demonstrate that defendants breached a duty of care owed to the plaintiffs. This 
could be accomplished by showing that the industry followed an inadequate stan-
dard. Second, the plaintiffs must establish that the group-created risk, that is, the 
standard, caused their injuries. Third, the plaintiffs must show by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the products involved in the accident were the products of the 
named defendants. Plaintiffs, however, do not have to identify which defendant man-
ufactured the product. See id. at 379. In other words, unlike altern!\tive liability, and 
similar to the market share approach, enterprise liability would not require all the 
potential il1iury-causers to be joined. See 301 (e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. 2, at C-30. 
Once plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of enterprise liability, the burden shifts to 
the defendants to prove that their product did not cause plaintiffs injury. See Hall, 
345 F. Supp. at 380. 
Hall, which developed the concept of enterprise liability, involved suits against 
manufacturers and a trade association. In separate incidents 13 children had been 
injured by blasting caps due to inadequate warnings and inadequate safety features. 
The industry-wide practice alleged by the plaintiffs was a longstanding custom of not 
placing a warning message on individual blasting caps. [d. at 359. 
Enterprise liability has not been imposed by courts in DES cases. 301 (e) RE-
PORT, supra note 4, pt. 2, at C-30. One court has called it "[an] expansive notion of 
vicarious liability. . . which would render every manufacturer an insurer not only of 
the safety of its own products, but of all generically similar products made by others 
.... " Ryan, 514 F. Supp. at 1017. Furthermore, enterprise liability would be most 
applicable to industries composed of a small number of units. See Hall, 345 F. Supp. 
at 378. The doctrine migh·t be unreasonable if applied to a decentralized industry 
composed ofthousands of producers. [d.; accord, Morton v. Abbott Laboratories, 538 
F. Supp. 593, 598 (M.D. Fla. 1982); Ryan, 514 F. Supp. at 1017; Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 
609, 607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143. The doctrine may not apply in the 
absence of industry delegation of safety standards to a trade association. See Morton, 
538 F. Supp. at 598; Ryan, 514 F. Supp. at 1017-18; Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 609,607 
P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143. Finally, enterprise liability might not be invoked if 
the industry is following standards suggested or compelled by a governmental regu-
latory body. See Morton, 538 F. Supp. at 598; Ryan, 514 F. Supp. at 1018; Sindell, 126 
Cal. 3d at 609,607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143. 
For these reasons, the enterprise liability theory likely would not be employed in 
hazardous waste cases. The waste generation and transportation industry is large 
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bility theory.154 Unlike enterprise liability, it does not require 
the plaintiff to join all of the actors who might have caused his 
injury.155 The plaintiff must, however, join the manufacturers 
of a substantial share of the product which injured the plaintiff. 
The burden of proof is then shifted to the defendants to 
demonstrate that they could not have made the substance 
which injured the plaintiff. 156 If they do not succeed in over-
coming this burden, they will each be liable for the proportion 
of the judgment represented by their share of the market. 157 
Even as these theories become more accepted elsewhere, 
and decentralized and there is no delegation of standard-setting to a trade 
association. 
154. See Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 610-12, 607 P.2d at 936-37, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144-45. 
155. See id. The market share liability doctrine was proposed by the California 
Supreme Court in Sindell. From a policy standpoint, the theory was imposed because 
"[thel defendants are better able to bear the cost of injury resulting from the manu-
facture of a defective product." Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 936, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 144. 
156. See id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. 
157. See id. In Sindell the plaintiff, a victim of cancer due to her mother's ingestion 
of DES, was unable to name the specific manufacturer of the DES which her mother 
had taken. /d. at 595-96, 607 P.2d at 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134. She therefore joined 
II of the major manufacturers of the drug and sued for relief. Id. at 593, 607 P.2d at 
925, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133. She alleged that the defendants failed to warn consumers 
of DES' potential dangers. /d. at 594, 607 P.2d at 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134. 
Extension of the market-share liability theory to hazardous waste cases presents 
some problems. It is unlikely that the plaintiff would be able to join a substantial 
number of the firms in the chemical manufacturing and transporting industries be-
cause the causal connection might be too remote. Joining a substantial number of 
the firms who had wastes deposited at the release site would seem to be a more 
plausible approach and there is some authority for this. Liability under § 9607 of the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CER-
CLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982), is joint and several where the defendants 
caused an indivisible harm. United States v. Chern-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 
(S.D. Ohio 1983). Perhaps due to uncertainty over whether this section does allow 
joint and several liability, and perhaps realizing that the plaintiff has severe problems 
of proof, the EPA and Justice Department have sought to obtain participation by all 
known contributors in the cleanup' of hazardous waste sites on a roughly pro-rata 
basis, taking into account primarily the volume, and also the toxicity of the wastes for 
which each party was alleged to be responsible. This approach, however, is distin-
guishable from the theory of market share liability in that it apportions cleanup cost 
after liability has been conclusively resolved; it does not merely shift the burden of 
proof. 
Two courts have had negative reactions to market-share liability. The court in 
Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004 (D.S.C. 1981), stated that it was a total 
departure from all previous rules of causation and liability and that it would repre-
sent "a rejection of 'over one hundred years of tort law which required ... a 'match-
ing' of defendant's conduct and plaintiffs injury' " before liability would be imposed. 
/d. at 1018 (quoting Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 616,607 P.2d at 939, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 147 
(Richardson, j., dissenting». The court in Morton v. Abbott Laboratories, 538 F. 
Supp. 593 (M.D. Fla. 1982) rejected market share liability for the same reason. Id. at 
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they may not be accepted in Minnesota. For example, Summers 
v. Tice, 158 the California case that founded the doctrine of alter-
native liability, has been cited only once in a Minnesota 
Supreme Court case. 159 Minnesota does, however, recognize 
the joint enterprise rule. Under this rule, when one participant 
in a joint enterprise negligently causes an injury, while acting 
within the scope of the enterprise, every participant in the en-
terprise is liable to the injured party.160 For ajoint enterprise, 
however, both a mutual undertaking for a common purpose 
and a right to a voice in the direction and control of the means 
used to carry out the common purpose must exist. 161 
In Minnesota, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the 
injury resulted from the actions of the defendant rather than 
from some other cause. Proof of negligence does not automat-
ically establish that such negligence was the cause of the injury. 
Negligence and causation are distinct elements of a tort and 
both elements must be pleaded and proved. 162 Proof of causa-
tion is also a necessary element in proving strict products lia-
bility; the plaintiff must show that his injury was caused by a 
defect in the defendant's product. 163 Since Minnesota requires 
joint participation and control, and a causal connection be-
tween each participant and the injury, there is no present indi-
cation that Minnesota will adopt any of these theories to ease 
the plaintiffs burden of proving causation. 
c. Summary 
Despite MERLA's provision of a strict, joint and several lia-
599-600. The rejection of market share liability in these two cases is understandable 
since they were federal diversity cases applying the law of the forum state. 
158. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948). 
159. Mathews v. Mills, 288 Minn. 16, 20-21, 178 N.W.2d 841, 844 (1970). The 
Mathews court cited Summers following a discussion of the propriety of imposing joint 
and several liability where two or more persons acting independently and negligently 
cause an indivisible injury. In Summers, one defendant caused the injury but joint and 
several liability was imposed because the defendants' conduct made it impossible for 
the plaintiff to prove which defendant actually injured him. Summers, 33 Cal. 2d at 80, 
199 P.2d at 1. 
160. Spannaus v. Otolaryngology Clinic, 308 Minn. 334, 339, 242 N.W.2d 594, 
597 (1976); see Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944). 
161. Delgado v. Lohmar, 289 N.W.2d 479,482 (Minn. 1979). 
162. See Lyons v. SCNEI, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 169, 170 (Minn. 1978); Vanderweyst v. 
Langford, 303 Minn. 575, 575, 228 N.W.2d 271, 272 (1975). 
163. See Worden v. Gangelhoff, 308 Minn. 252, 254-55, 241 N.W.2d 650, 651 
(1976). 
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bility rule, the proof of causation remains a very substantial 
hurdle for a MERLA plaintiff to overcome. Proof of causation 
under common law may be even more difficult because Minne-
sota has not adopted the legal theories sometimes used in 
other states to ease the plaintiff's burden of proof. Finally, 
though it may be desirable to compensate victims who cannot 
prove who caused their injury, the traditional tort law system 
may be an inappropriate mechanism to achieve this goal. 164 
4. Other Practical Limitations 
a. Cost and Delay 
In addition to the many limitations found in the theory and 
application of existing rules of law, there are significant practi-
cal limitations on a victim's access to compensation. As one 
commentator has noted, " 'Small' individual claims cannot be 
handled economically in the tort litigation process." 165 Due to 
the complexities involved in proving toxic tort cases, 166 the liti-
gation tends to be extremely expensive167 in terms of both 
time and money.I 68 To prove a case, the plaintiff must often 
rely on highly trained expert witnesses in both medicine and 
science. Expert witnesses often command a high hourly fee for 
preparing cases and testifying, and cannot be paid on a contin-
gent fee basis. A victim will initiate legal action only if he be-
lieves that the damage award will exceed the time, effort, and 
actual expenses of bringing suit. 169 
Given the current judicial backlog, the legal system may be 
unable to deal with a plethora of claims. A single event of ex-
posure of a large number of people to a hazardous substance 
release, or a large number of people who discover their latent 
diseases at the same time, may flood the courts' calenders.I 70 
Complex cases usually take several years to get to trial and, if 
164. See A. Roisman, Common Law Toxic Tort Litigation: Strengths, Weak-
nesses, Reforms, Alternatives 2 (1983) (unpublished manuscript, on file at the Wil-
liam Mitchell Law Review Office). 
165. R. Marzulla. Toxic Tort Claims-Possible Inadequacies in the Current Tort 
System 4 (Nov. 2. 1983) (unpublished manuscript prepared for the Keystone Center 
Project. on file at the William Mitchell Law Review Office). 
166. Id. 
167. Roisman. supra note 164. at 5. 
168. Trauberman. supra note 9. at 189; Roisman. supra note 164. at 5. 
169. Trauberman. supra note 9. at 189-90 & n.54. 
170. Anderson. supra note 60, at 164. 
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appealed, take one or two more years to be finally resolved}71 
As a result, victims may have to wait to be compensated until 
long, drawn-out legal proceedings have ended. 
Plaintiffs with small claims or who are in need of money may 
be forced to settle out of court for an amount far below their 
actual damages. 172 While settlements that conserve time and 
money are generally desirable for all concerned, settlement ne-
gotiations result in equitable solutions only if all parties are 
well informed about damages and the probability of success,l73 
For example, a victim of hazardous substances may be unaware 
of the chronic effects of the chemical and may consequently 
negotiate a settlement based only on the harm that has mani-
fested itself to date,l74 Both parties may overestimate their 
chances of success and be reluctant to concede any points of 
negotiation. 
While well-informed parties may sometimes reach equitable 
negotiated solutions, there is still the problem of costly litiga-
tion when negotiations fail. Indeed, high litigation costs auto-
matically bias negotiations against the financially weaker and 
more risk-averse litigant, usually the plaintiff. Litigation costs 
can be reduced by making it easier for persons with similar 
claims to join together in one action. 175 This can be accom-
plished through the use of permissive joinder of parties under 
the Federal and Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure}76 Per-
missive joinder is often appropriate for victims of hazardous 
substance releases. Hazardous substances in one location may 
affect several individuals. The similar or identical elements of 
exposure may result in different types of injuries}" 
Other methods of joining plaintiffs' claims include the insti-
tution of class actions 178 and the offensive use of collateral es-
toppel, a legal doctrine that prevents relitigation of an issue 
171. Marzulla, supra note 165, at 6. 
172. Traubennan, supra note 9, at 189-90. 
173. See id. at 190. 
174. [d. at 190-91. 
175. 301 (e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. 1, at 67. 
176. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a); MINN. R. CIV. P. 20.01. 
177. 301(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. 1, at 67-68. 
178. Marzulla, supra note 165, at 3. "A class action is a suit brought by one or 
more plaintiffs on behalf of a large number of others similarly situated. The action 
requires that there be common issues of law and fact and that the parties be so nu-
merous as to make it impractical to join them as individuals." [d. 
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already decided between the same parties. 179 There have also 
been some significant efforts at voluntary coordination of tort 
claims, as in the formation of the Dalkon Shield Group in 
1974, the DES cases, actions against Chevrolet for motor 
mount failure, and the MER/29 drug cases. ISO 
MERLA attempts to ease the litigation costs of parties in-
volved in toxic tort cases in section 1 15B.14. It states, "Upon 
motion of a party prevailing in an action under sections 
115B.O 1 to 115B.15 the court may award costs, disbursements 
and reasonable attorney fees and witness fees to that party."ISI 
Of course, this fee-shifting is only available after litigation and 
does little to help finance the costs of preparing for and con-
ducting the litigation. 
Toxic tort victims can alleviate problems of time and cost if 
they make use of permissive joinder and if they are awarded 
costs under section 115B.14. All plaintiffs, however, may not 
benefit. Some plaintiffs may not wish to join, preferring to rely 
on their own counsel for legal expertise. They may believe 
that they have a better chance of being fully compensated if 
they sue individually. Furthermore, in the case of latent inju-
ries, injured parties may have moved from the area of the re-
lease, making it difficult for a plaintiff to locate prospective 
joint plaintiffs. In addition, two things must be remembered 
about section 115B.14: (1) it is discretionary-a court does 
not have to award costs; and (2) if the plaintiff loses, the court 
may award costs to the defendant. This could deter a plaintiff 
from bringing suit. In fact, such cost awards are rare, but sec-
tion 115B.14's language allows a court to award costs to one 
party even where the other party has not acted in bad faith. 
This represents an extension of the court's preexisting 
power. IS2 
In sum, despite the mechanisms available to plaintiffs for 
sharing or recovering litigation costs, the cost problem re-
179. See, e.g., E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 250 F. Supp. 
B16 (D. Ill. 1966) (discussion of the doctrine of collateral estoppel). 
1BO. 301(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. I, at 6B. In discussing the weaknesses of the 
tort system, Anthony Z. Roisman suggests other solutions to the high costs borne by 
toxic tort plaintiffs. See Roisman, supra note 164, at 6-7. 
1B1. MINN. STAT. § 115B.14. 
1B2. See id. § 549.21. "[T]he court in its discretion may award ... costs ... if the 
party or attorney against whom costs . . . are charged acted in bad faith." Id. 
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mains a substantial impediment to compensation for victims of 
hazardous substance exposure. 
h. Insolvent Defendants 
Another factor which must be considered is the system's 
possible effects on defendants. The costs of defending hazard-
ous waste lawsuits are likely to be quite high due to the com-
plexity of the subject matter, and the need for sophisticated 
scientific data and support by experts' testimony}83 In addi-
tion, once causation is established in a toxic tort case, defend-
ants may face extremely high damage awards. 184 In one 
asbestos-employee injury case, a $13 million single injury 
award was handed down against a relatively small company.185 
The cases against Johns-Manville Corporation provide another 
example. Johns-Manville, the nation's largest asbestos manu-
facturer,186 declared bankruptcy in anticipation of a large 
number of lawsuits by Manville workers stemming from their 
handling of asbestos materials. 
Few firms can handle this type OflOSS.187 One way to assure 
that victims will be compensated is to require financial respon-
sibility for those who run hazardous waste disposal sites. The 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) 188 
requires the EPA to establish financial standards for owners 
and operators of hazardous waste treatment, storage, or dispo-
sal facilities. 189 Acting under this authority, the EPA has issued 
regulations requiring owners or operators of such facilities to 
maintain liability insurance for injury or damage to third par-
183. See Anderson, supra note 60, at 170-71. 
184. See Trauberman, supra note 9, at 191 n.63; if. Barsky, supra note 140, at 35-
37. 
185. See Trauberman, supra note 9, at 191 n.63 (noting Mehaffy, Asbestos-Related 
Lung Disease, 16 FORUM 341, 348 (1980)). 
186. Johns-Manville earned $60.3 million on its sales in 1981, enabling it to rank 
18lst on the Fortune 500 list of America's largest corporations. Anderson, supra 
note 60, at 167. Since 1968, Manville has been the defendant in 200,000 lawsuits and 
has paid out $50 million in claims. A consulting firm advised Manville that it could 
expect 50,000 more lawsuits. Manville estimated that each claim would cost $40,000 
to handle and that the anticipated lawsuits would eventually cost the company over 
$2 billion. See id.; Trauberman, supra note 9, at 191 n.63. 
187. Anderson, supra note 60, at 171. 
188. Pub. L. No. 94-580,90 Stat. 2769 (1976) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 
(1982)). 
189. See 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (1982). 
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ties}90 Insurance for "sudden and accidental occurrences" 
must be maintained in the amount of at least $1 million per 
occurrence with a $2 million annual aggregate. In addition, 
owners or operators of facilities must maintain liability insur-
ance for non-sudden occurrences in the amount of at least $3 
million per occurrence with a $6 million annual aggregate, ex-
clusive of legal defense costS}91 Furthermore, the Minnesota 
Pollution Control Agency has promulgated rules requiring lia-
bility coverage for owners or operators of hazardous waste 
treatment, disposal, or storage facilities}92 
A variety of insurance policies are available to cover per-
sonal and property damage caused by the release of pollutants 
or hazardous substances into the environment. Traditionally, 
companies have carried a Comprehensive General Liability 
(CGL) policy, which provides coverage for "sudden and acci-
dental" pollution on an occurrence basis. While this type of 
coverage will apply to liability arising out of a spill or other 
similar event, problems arise when the effects are not known 
until years after the event, or where there is gradual seep-
ing}93 Some courts have recently stretched the scope of sud-
den and accidental insurance coverage to include injuries 
which have not become apparent until long after the occur-
rence}94 These cases have prompted many insurers to stop 
writing pollution liability coverage on an occurrence basis. In-
stead, insurers are writing environmental insurance coverage 
on a claims-made basis. Under a claims-made policy, coverage 
extends to any claims made for injuries resulting from releases 
where the claims are presented to the insured during the pe-
riod of coverage.l95 
Insurance companies have recently begun offering high-limit 
190. 40 C.F.R. §§ 264.147(a) (1982) (permanent status standards), 265.147(a) 
(1982) (interim status standards). "This insurance had to be in effect by July 15, 
1982." Hall, supra note 142, at 615. 
191. 40 C.F.R. §§ 264.147(a), (b) (1982); see Hall, supra note 142, at 615. 
192. See MINN. R. § 7045.0620 (Supp. 1984). 
193. Hall, supra note 142, at 617-18. 
194. /d. at 618; see, e.g., City of Kimball v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 190 Neb. 
152,206 N.W.2d 632 (1973) (pollution of irrigation well due to seepage from city's 
sewer); Lansco, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 138 NJ. Super 275, 350 
A.2d 520 (1975) (oil seepage into river held sudden and accidental); Allstate Ins. Co. 
v. Klock Oil Co., 73 A.D.2d 486,426 N.Y.S.2d 603 (1980) (gradual discharge ofgaso-
line from storage tank held sudden and accidental). 
195. See Hall, supra note 142, at 618. 
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coverage for "nonsudden or gradual" pollution under Envi-
ronmental/Impairment Liability (ElL) policies, which are also 
claims-made policies,l96 These policies contain various liabil-
ity limits l97 which apply once to each pollution incident re-
gardless of the number of separate claims from that 
incident. 198 The Pollution Liability Insurance Association, a 
group of thirty-seven companies constituting a reinsurance 
pool, offers a new policy for companies offering coverage for 
sudden and non-sudden incidents under a single claims-made 
form. The basic coverage is available up to $5 million per site 
although higher express limits may be obtained,l99 
These policies appear to be adequate to deal with common 
law liability for releases causing environmental damage. Large 
companies have obtained environmental claims-made insur-
ance coverage that exceeds $100 million.20o Even this kind of 
insurance, however, may not be a complete panacea. Though 
the policy may allow coverage to be initiated from a retroactive 
date, it may not extend back to cover a release which occurred 
many years ago. The policy may contain other significant limi-
tations. For example, the ElL form commonly states that cov-
erage applies only to specifically named sites. Also frequently 
excluded from coverage are items such as damages caused by 
sudden and accidental happenings, liability due to genetic 
damage, damages assessed under the concept of joint and sev-
eral liability, and damages due to releases from a closed or 
abandoned site.201 Finally, though the EPA may require own-
ers and operators of facilities to obtain liability insurance, 
196. /d. 
197. See Stewart, Environmental Impairment Liability Insurance Availability and Cost in 
HAZARDOUS WASTE REGULATION AND LIABILIlY 351, 353 (Advanced Legal Education, 
Hamline University School of Law 1983). The premium cost for ElL varies widely 
depending upon the nature of the business, the size of the firm, the number of sites 
that contain toxic chemicals that the firm is responsible for, and the firm's past and 
present waste management practices. Premiums vary significantly between insurance 
companies due to the lack of actuarial data and the highly judgmental nature of most 
rate schemes that are used to establish premiums. /d. at 353. "Environmental im-
pairment" is defined as the "emission, discharge, dispersal, disposal, seepage, release 
or escape of any liquid, solid, gaseous or thermal irritant, contaminant or pollutant 
into or upon land, the atmosphere or any watercourse or body of water." /d. at 355. 
198. Id. at 356. 
199. Hall, supra note 142, at 618-19. 
200. Id. at 619. 
201. See Stewart, supra note 197, at 355-58. 
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there is no requirement that generators or transporters main-
tain the insurance. 
The potentially enormous costs that may result to defend-
ants from hazardous substance personal injury claims can ex-
ceed a defendant's ability to pay. The result is bankrupt 
defendants and uncompensated plaintiffs. Insurance can help 
alleviate this potential problem, but policy limitations may ex-
clude some releases from coverage. Insolvency of defendants 
may thus continue to be a major problem for injured parties. 
B. Alternatives to MERLA 
Some plaintiffs will not sue under MERLA either because its 
statutory provisions foreclose their suit or because they feel a 
different remedy would be easier to obtain. For example, a 
plaintiffs suit may be precluded by MERLA's provisions limit-
ing retroactive liability or recovery may be limited by MERLA's 
ceiling on joint and several liability.202 MERLA expressly al-
lows toxic tort victims to seek other avenues of redress in sec-
tion 115B.12. 203 Those victims who do so will find that these 
other remedies are greatly limited in their usefulness. 
1. Other Statutory Remedies 
Several federal environmental statutes provide for civil or 
criminal actions for violations set forth in the statutes or regu-
lations. However, statutory provisions for the recovery of 
damages by private plaintiffs are rare.204 Six federal statutes 
have a significant impact on hazardous waste disposal; none 
expressly provide for compensation to hazardous waste victims 
for personal injury or damage.205 Five of the statutes provide a 
private citizen with the right to sue for enforcement of the stat-
202. MINN. STAT. §§ 115B.06, .09; see Whitehead & Christenson, supra note 128, at 
263. 
203. See Van de North, Hazardous Waste Litigation Common Law Causes of Action in 
HAZARDOUS WASTE REGULATION AND LIABILITY 239, 241 (Advanced Legal Education, 
Hamline University School of Law 1983). 
204. See 301(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. I, at 72. 
205. The six statutes are: (I) The Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 (TSCA) 
15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982); (2) The Clean Water Act of 1977 (CWA) 33 U.S.C. 
§§ 1251-1376 (1982); (3) The Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-
300j(lO) (1982); (4) The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987; (5) The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657; and (6) The Haz-
ardous Materials Transportation Act of 1975, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1812 (1982). 
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utes' provisions.206 The Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) 
does provide a remedy for private citizens for certain property 
damages,207 but it has no mechanism to enable a private indi-
vidual to trigger action by the EPA.208 
The Federal Tort Claims Act209 may provide the basis for 
claims against the federal government for tortious acts of its 
employees or agents. This may be useful where the federal 
government owns or operates a disposal site. 
The Minnesota Environmental Rights Law210 provides a civil 
remedy for private citizens. It allows private citizens to bring 
civil actions in the name of the state for declaratory or equita-
ble relief against any person for the protection of publicly or 
privately owned natural resources located within the state.211 
However, it has no provision for the recovery of property or 
personal injury damages. 
Minnesota also has a Tort Claims Act,212 which could pro-
vide the basis for tort claims against the state, and a Municipal 
Tort Liability Act,213 which provides for tort claims against lo-
cal units of government. Of course some basis for the state or 
local unit's liability, such as negligent operation of a disposal 
facility, has to be found. As noted above, there is an upper 
206. See Note, supra note 91, at 952. 
207. See, e.g., Pinole Properties, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F. Supp. 283 
(D. Cal. 1983) (court determined that private party could settle for certain property 
damages under the provisions of § 107(a)(4)(B) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9607(a)(4)(B) (1982». 
208. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982). Section 9607 ofCERCLA does allow a 
private party who incurred cleanup or remedial costs to recover them from any re-
sponsible party. See id. 
209. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 1402,2401,2671-2680 (1982). There must be a negli-
gent or wrongful act or ommission. The FTCA compensates for injury or loss of 
property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or 
ommission of any government employee acting within the scope of his office. /d. 
§ 1346(b); see Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247, 337 (D. Utah 1984) (in action 
to recover for cancer and leukemia caused by emmission of nuclear fallout in Atomic 
Energy Commission testing, the jurisdictional standard requires action by an em-
ployee which falls below the standard of "due care" in executing a statute or regula-
tion). So it would appear that strict liability-based claims cannot be brought against 
the United States. 
210. MINN. STAT. ch. 116B (1984). 
211. See id. § 116B.03. 
212. [d. § 3.736. 
213. [d. § 466.01-.15. 
HeinOnline -- 11 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 708 1985
708 WILLIAM MITCHELL LA W REVIEW [Vol. 11 
limit on the liability of local units of government under 
MERLA, but, there is no limit on the state's liability. 
2. Implied Private Remedies 
Even if a statute does not explicitly create a private right of 
action for personal injury due to hazardous substance releases, 
a plaintiff may claim that a private right of action is implied.214 
Over one hundred years of legal precedent support the con-
cept of an implied right of private action arising out of a statu-
tory provision.215 
In the case of Cort v. Ash,216 the Supreme Court listed the 
necessary criteria for a private cause of action to arise out of a 
federal statute.217 The Court enumerated four factors relevant 
to determining whether a private right of action should be im-
plied: whether the claimant is a member of the class protected 
by the statute; whether the act's legislative history indicates an 
intention to either create or deny a private remedy; whether 
implying a private remedy is consistent with the act's purpose; 
and whether the cause of action is one relegated to state law.218 
Subsequent Supreme Court cases have narrowed the impact of 
Cort's four factor test219 and have declined to give equal weight 
to each of the four factors, making it more difficult to find a 
private right of action implied in federal statutes. 
For example, in California v. Sierra Club 220 an environmental 
organization and two private citizens sought to enjoin the con-
struction and operation of certain water diversion facilities 
which would allegedly degrade water quality in a delta, in vio-
lation of section 310 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriations 
Act of 1899.221 Section 310 prohibits "[t]he creation of any 
obstruction not affirmatively authorized by Congress, to the 
navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United States 
.••. "222 No provision was made, however, for private en-
214. See 301(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. I, at 85. 
215. See Comment, supra note 50, at 740. 
216. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). 
217. See id. at 78; 301(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. I, at 86. 
218. See Cort, 422 U.S. at 78. 
219. See 301(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. I, at 85-88. 
220. 451 U.S. 287 (1981). 
221. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1982); see Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 290-92; see also 301(e) RE-
PORT, supra note 4, pt. I, at 86-87. 
222. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1982). 
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forcement. 2211 The Supreme Court said that "the ultimate is-
sue is whether Congress intended to create a private right of 
action. . . . "224 The Court indicated that the four Cort factors 
were the criteria for determining this issue, but that they are 
not entitled to equal weight.225 The Court focused on con-
gressional intent, saying that the inquiry is no longer "simply 
who would benefit from the Act, but whether Congress in-
tended to confer federal rights upon those beneficiaries."226 
This approach looks to the legislative history for indications of 
congressional intent to either create or deny a certain rem-
edy.227 If there is neither evidence that Congress intended to 
benefit a particular class, nor evidence that it intended to cre-
ate a private remedy, then no private right of action exists.228 
The legislative history of the Rivers and Harbors Act pro-
vided "no indication of congressional intent to either imply or 
deny a remedy for the private litigant. "229 Silence in the legis-
lative history may demonstrate congressional intent not to cre-
ate the remedy,2110 or it may demonstrate "congressional 
acquiescence" in the continuance of a private right of action 
that existed prior to the statute's enactment.2111 
More recently, in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. Na-
tional Sea Clammers Association,232 the Supreme Court again re-
fused to recognize an implied right of action under an 
environmental statute.2311 The National Sea Clammers Associ-
ation brought an action for damages pursuant to the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act234 and the Marine Protection and 
Sanctuaries Act,235 seeking recovery for the discharge of sew-
223. See id. 
224. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 293. 
225. See id. at 297. 
226. [d. at 294. 
227. See id. at 293-98; see also 301(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. I, at 87. 
228. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 294-98. The latter two Cart factors, consistency with 
the legislative scheme and relegation to state remedies, "are only of relevance if the 
first two factors give indication of congressional intent to create the remedy." [d. at 
298. 
229. See Comment, supra note 50, at 741. 
230. [d. at 741-42 (citing Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 
II, 18 (1979». 
231. [d. at 742 (citing Canon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 702-03 
(1979». 
232. 453 U.S. 1 (1981). 
233. [d. at 22; see also Comment, supra note 50, at 742. 
234. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982). 
235. [d. §§ 1401-1445 (1982). 
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age that had resulted in the destruction of an enormous 
amount of marine life.236 The Court held that the plaintiffs 
were not entitled to a private remedy under the acts, emphasiz-
ing the comprehensive enforcement provisions, including citi-
zen suit provisions, contained within each act. In view of the 
acts' comprehensive enforcement provisions, the Court con-
cluded that it could not assume that Congress intended that 
additional remedies be available to private litigants suing 
under the acts.237 
Most recently, in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Cur-
ran,238 the Supreme Court seemed to relax its analysis of con-
gressional intent when determining whether a cause of action 
should be implied under a federal law. In this case, the Court 
held that private parties may maintain an action for damages 
caused by a violation of the Commodity Exchange Act.239 The 
Court reasoned that Congress intended to grant private litigants 
a remedy under the Commodity Exchange Act when it 
amended the statute in 1974.240 Its basis for finding intent was 
Congress' failure to indicate that the private remedy did not 
exist in the face of prior case law which held that an implied 
cause of action did exist under the Act.241 Previous case law 
had consistently recognized an implied cause of action.242 It 
did not matter that this interpretation was supplanted by later 
case law. In the Court's opinion, "it [was] abundantly clear 
that an implied cause of action existed under the [Act and] was 
a part of the 'contemporary legal context' in which Congress 
legislated in 1974."243 Thus, Congress intended to preserve 
the preexisting remedy.244 In the Court's opinion, this obvi-
ated the need to apply the four factor test for determining in-
tent.245 Since Merrill Lynch, the Supreme Court has decided a 
number of additional implied cause of action cases in which 
the basic analytical approach appears to be the one used in Sea 
Clammers and Merrill Lynch: to determine whether Congress in 
236. 453 U.S. at 4-5; see also Comment, supra note 50, at 742. 
237. 301{e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. 2, at F5-F7. 
238. 456 U.S. 353 (l982). 
239. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (l982). 
240. Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. at 381-82. 
241. See id. 
242. Id. at 379. 
243. Id. at 381. 
244. Id. at 381-82. 
245. See id. at 388. 
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passing a given act intended, by implication, that a private 
right of action be available.246 
Merrill Lynch might seem favorable for a claimant who seeks 
to establish an implied cause of action, but it should be noted 
that the Court's holding was limited to specific factual circum-
stances. Those factual circumstances are found where preex-
isting case law has determined that an implied right exists, and 
where Congress has reexamined and amended a statute with-
out noting the existence of such case law. 
Many federal environmental statutes contain comprehensive 
enforcement provisions which are often supplemented by pro-
visions for citizen suits. In the wake of the Sea Clammers case 
and in view of the narrow scope of the reasoning in Merrill 
Lynch, plaintiffs seeking private relief for the violation of fed-
eral environmental statutes are not likely to prevail on an im-
plied cause of action theory.247 The Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act, for example, contains a provision for citizen 
suits against the government for failure to perform a non-dis-
cretionary duty under the Act, or against a private party for 
violation of the Act.248 This language strongly suggests that 
the citizen's suit is limited to declaratory or injunctive relief, 
and does not provide the basis for a private action for dam-
ages.249 In addition, language in the Act suggests that it was 
enacted to provide for the health and environment of the na-
tion in general, rather than a particular class of people.250 
CERCLA mayor may not present a different story. Like 
other environmental statutes, the Act provides for elaborate 
enforcement mechanisms.251 These enforcement mechanisms, 
however, are currently available only to the government.252 
Also, unlike other statutes, CERCLA has no mechanisms to en-
able the private individual to trigger action by the EPA.253 
One commentator has suggested that CERCLA addresses vic-
246. Daily Income Fund v. Fox, 104 S. Ct. 831 (1984); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 
U.S. 731 (1982); Jackson Transit Authority v. Local Div. No. 1285, 457 U.S. 15 
(1982). 
247. 301(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. 2, at F6-F7. 
248. Hall, supra note 142, at 606 (citing RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6972, 7002). 
249. [d. 
250. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901(b)(2), 6902 (1982). 
251. See Comment, supra note 50, at 744. 
252. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9604. 
253. See Comment, supra note 50, at 744. 
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tims exposed to hazardous substances as a class.254 Then 
again, the Act's provisions taken as a whole suggest that they 
are intended to protect the national health and environ-
ment.255 Thus, the possibility of an implied remedy existing 
under CERCLA is uncertain. 
The availability of implied remedies under Minnesota regu-
latory statutes is also uncertain. The Minnesota Environmen-
tal Rights Law may influence the result. In deciding whether 
to imply a private remedy for violation of legislative enact-
ments, the Minnesota courts would initially seek to ascertain 
legislative intent. If no specific legislative intent is ascertained, 
the court would usually examine the policy underlying the stat-
ute or the legislature's purpose in enacting it.256 Minnesota's 
express provision of a civil suit mechanism in section 116B.03 
of the Environmental Rights Law is perhaps an indication that 
the legislature intended that no implied causes of action under 
other statutes be available. The express purpose of the statute, 
however, is to protect the natural resources of the state; not to 
protect the private citizen from the health effects of hazardous 
substance releases.257 That in tum indicates that the Environ-
mental Rights Law is not meant to preclude the availability of 
any personal injury or damages cause of action, either express 
or implied. 
3. Common Law Remedies 
a. Trespass 
Trespass is defined as unlawful, negligent, or intentional in-
terference with another's possessory interest in land.258 It is 
not, therefore, a theory of liability which anticipates personal 
injury claims. Trespass may result from invasion by escaping 
waters and other substances onto adjoining lands.259 The tres-
pass cause of action has been used in a few cases in other juris-
254. See id. at 743-44. 
255. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (l982). 
256. 301(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. 2, at F-9. 
257. See MINN. STAT. § 116B.01. 
258. See All American Foods, Inc. v. County of Aitkin, 266 N.W.2d 704, 705 
(Minn. 1978). 
259. See Wilson v. Ramacher, 352 N.W.2d 389 (Minn. 1984); Bridgeman-Russell 
Co. v. City of Duluth, 158 Minn. 509, 510, 512,197 N.W. 971, 972 (1924) (overrul-
ing of demurrer to complaint upheld on appeal where municipality was sued for 
property damages caused by water escaping through 20-inch water main which ex-
tended through center of city). 
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dictions where the released substance was hazardous and 
caused injury.26o 
Other than in these few cases, trespass has rarely been used 
as a cause of action for property damage caused by pollu-
tants261 due to a number of obstacles to recovery encountered 
with this cause of action.262 In practice many courts treat the 
trespass cause of action as either negligence or strict liabil-
ity,263 thus exposing plaintiffs to the limitations of those causes 
of action.264 In addition, while a defendant may be able to 
claim contribution from a co-trespasser,265 such co-trespassers 
would often not include generators of hazardous substances 
due to the fact that the generators' acts would be too remote 
from the actual trespass.266 Finally, while the Minnesota stat-
ute of limitations for trespass is six years,267 judging from the 
language of the statute, it probably begins to run when the acts 
constituting the trespass occur rather than upon discovery of 
the trespass.268 
b. Nuisance 
A nuisance is an unreasonable interference with the plain-
tiffs use and enjoyment of his property.269 The elements of 
nuisance are threefold: (1) significant harm must result from 
260. See, e.g., Curry Coal Co. v. Aroni Co., 439 Pa. 114,266 A.2d 678 (1970) (per-
mitting plaintiff to recover in trespass when chemical sludge from defendant's dump-
site flowed into plaintiff's coal mine); Martin v. Reynolds Metal Co., 221 Or. 86, 342 
P.2d 790 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 918 (1960) (allowing action in trespass for es-
caping fluoride which entered plaintiff's property resulting in cattle deaths and prop-
erty loss). 
261. 301(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. 2, at I-I. 
262. See infra notes 267-72 and accompanying text. 
263. See 301(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. 2, at 1-3. 
264. See infra text accompanying notes 273-99. 
265. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 79, § 165. 
266. See Curry Coal, 439 Pa. 114, 266 A.2d 678; Phillips v. Sun Oil Co., 307 N.Y. 
328, 121 N.E.2d 249 (1954); Thompson v. Board ofEduc., 124 Misc. 840, 207 W. Va. 
Supp. 362 (1939). 
267. See MINN. STAT. § 541.05(3) (1984). 
268. See id. 
269. MINN. STAT. § 561.01 defines as a nuisance: 
Anything which is injurious to health, or indecent or offensive to the senses, 
or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the 
comfortable enjoyment oflife or property, is a nuisance. An action may be 
brought by any person whose property is injuriously affected or whose per-
sonal enjoyment is lessened by the nuisance, and by the judgment the nui-
sance may be enjoined or abated, as well as damages recovered. 
[d. § 561.01 (1984). 
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an invasion of the plaintiffs legal interest in preserving his 
health and free use of his property; (2) the defendant's conduct 
must be the cause of the plaintiffs injury; and (3) the invasion 
of the plaintiffs rights must be intentional and unreasonable 
or unintentional and otherwise actionable.270 The mainte-
nance of a contaminated hazardous waste site may fit the de-
scription of a nuisance because the threat of personal 
discomfort or disease interferes with use and enjoyment of 
property.271 It has been held that contamination of ground-
water used for industrial purposes is a nuisance.272 The Min-
nesota Supreme Court has also held that the drainage of 
creamery and other wastes onto another's land is a nuisance.273 
This cause of action, however, has several limitations. 
Only persons with an interest in real property can recover 
except in those very limited circumstances in which a private 
party can sue for a public nuisance. The resolution of nuisance 
cases requires a balancing of the equities: a weighing of the 
plaintiff's interest against the social and economic utility of the 
defendant's activities that cause the interference. The produc-
tion of goods or services which generate hazardous wastes may 
or may not be socially desirable. In some cases, those goods or 
services meet a substantial need, and the interference with a 
plaintiff's use and enjoyment of property caused by the result-
ing hazardous wastes may not be considered unreasonable, 
thus adding to the difficulty of a nuisance claim.274 The very 
substantial and growing concern about hazardous substances 
and the growing belief that land disposal of these substances 
may be unnecessary, however, could mean that a hazardous 
waste disposal site may not be considered as having a very high 
utility. When balanced against the interference with a plain-
tiffs interest, particularly his interest in protecting his health, 
hazardous substance disposal could be considered a nuisance. 
In Minnesota, defendants causing an indivisible injury 
through their negligence are jointly and severally liable for the 
270. See Randall v. City of Excelsior, 258 Minn. 81, 103 N.W.2d 131 (1960). 
271. See 30I(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. I, at 90; see Highview N. Apartments v. 
County of Ramsey, 323 N.W.2d 65,71 (Minn. 1982). 
272. See Berger v. Minneapolis Gaslight Co., 60 Minn. 296,62 N.W. 336 (1895). 
273. See Herrmann v. Larson, 214 Minn. 46, 7 N.W.2d 330 (1943). 
274. 301 (e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. I, at 106. 
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entire award, even if they did not act in concert.275 Thus, if 
several generators independently dispose of hazardous sub-
stances at a single site, causing a single indivisible injury, liabil-
ity for resulting injuries would be joint and several. 
c. Negligence 
A cause of action for negligence could arise out of the im-
proper disposal of hazardous wastes, improper transportation 
of such wastes, negligent spills, the negligent causation of haz-
ardous waste surface runoff, or the negligent contamination of 
subsurface water. Negligence, however, deals with conduct, 
not with conditions. The defendant must be at fault, that is, 
charged with having done some act or failing to do some act 
which he had a duty to undertake, in a manner which violates a 
standard of care.276 
The use of negligence as a cause of action may be difficult 
where the improper act of disposal took place many years ago, 
because evidence may be difficult to produce. It may be diffi-
cult to prove that there was a known risk and that the disposer 
was aware of the risk. In order to demonstrate proximate 
cause, the plaintiff will have to produce evidence of a faulty 
instrumentality or an inadequate method of disposal, and evi-
dence of a defendant's control of the instrumentality or 
method employed.277 
d. Common Law Strict Liability 
When using a strict liability cause of action, a plaintiff will 
have to demonstrate something inherent in the nature of the 
defendant's injury-producing activity that justifies the place-
ment of liability without fault upon the defendant for damages 
caused by the activity. There are differing standards as to what 
characteristics make an activity a candidate for strict liability. 
These standards include a non-natural use of land, an ul-
trahazardous activity, an abnormally dangerous activity, and 
strict products liability. Indeed, it is probably more accurate to 
view the various liability tests as separate theories of liability. 
Strict liability for a non-natural use of land found its begin-
275. Ruberg v. Skelly Oil Co., 297 N.W.2d 746, 752 (Minn. 1980); Matthews v. 
Mills, 288 Minn. 16,22-23, 178 N.W.2d 841,845-46 (1970). 
276. 301(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. 1, at 97. 
277. Id. at 99. 
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nings in the English case of Rylands v. Fletcher. 278 Under this 
principle, courts determine whether an activity is "natural" by 
considering its appropriateness in its location.279 Specific cri-
teria that courts look to are the character of the thing or activ-
ity, the place and manner in which it is maintained, and its 
relation to its surroundings.28o The doctrine of strict liability 
for engaging in an ultrahazardous activity is taken from section 
520 of the first Restatement of Torts.281 The standard of "ab-
normally dangerous" is taken from sections 519 and 520 of the 
Second Restatement of Torts282 and strict products liability 
theory is founded on section 402A.283 
The Rylands v. Fletcher test and the "abnormally dangerous" 
test of the Second Restatement are both balancing tests. They 
consider the appropriateness of the activity in the particular 
surroundings and involve a weighing of competing interests.284 
The "ultrahazardous activity" test, however, does not balance 
opposing interests; it focuses mainly on the inherent danger-
ousness of the activity itself.285 Multifactor balancing tests like 
those of Rylands and section 520 of the Second Restatement 
encourage courts to approach the question of strict liability on 
a case-by-case basis, thereby complicating and prolonging liti-
gation. The use of balancing also encourages courts to inject 
notions of due care or fault into the analysis, making strict lia-
bility seem more like negligence. This mode of analysis sub-
jects strict liability plaintiffs to the same types of problems 
encountered by negligence plaintiffs.286 Thus, the "ul-
trahazardous activity" test is the test most favorable to toxic 
tort plaintiffs. 
The difficulty of showing that anyone activity is abnormally 
dangerous was shown in the case of Ferguson v. Northern States 
Power CO.287 In Ferguson, the Minnesota Supreme Court de-
clined to hold that the transmission of high-voltage electricity 
278. 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (1865), rev'd, 1 L.R.-Ex. 265 (1866), ajJ'd, 3 L.R.-E. & I. 
App. 330 (1869). 
279. 301(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. I, at 114. 
280. Id. at 115. 
281. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520 (1938). 
282. RESTATEMENT, supra note 79, § 520. 
283. Id. § 402A. 
284. 301(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. I, at 115, 119. 
285. /d. at 116-17. 
286. /d. at 120-21. 
287. 307 Minn. 26, 239 N.W.2d 190 (1976). 
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was an abnormally dangerous activity, even though recogniz-
ing that the activity was highly dangerous and presented the 
risk of unusually serious harm.288 The court was persuaded by 
the severe economic consequences which could be sustained 
by small electric utilities through the imposition of strict liabil-
ity.289 Like the transmission of electricity, the generation, 
transportation, and disposal of hazardous substances presents 
danger and the risk of serious harm. Imposing strict liability 
on generators, transporters, and disposers could subject such 
actors to severe economic consequences, like bankruptcy, due 
to the possibiity of high damage awards. Thus, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court may refuse to impose strict liability for the 
same reasons mentioned in Ferguson. 
Quite recently, in a somewhat similar case, the court refused 
to impose strict liability on a natural gas company for damages 
resulting from a leak in a gas main located in a public street 
and a consequent explosion. The court recognized that the 
risk from escaping natural gas is great and that this risk is 
highly dangerous to persons and property. The court never-
theless refused to impose strict liability, primarily because the 
gas lines were not under the exclusive control of the gas 
company.290 
Personal injury caused by exposure to a hazardous substance 
in a defective consumer product would presumably be the ba-
sis for a traditional section 402A products liability claim.291 
However, injury caused by release of such a substance from a 
hazardous waste site is unlikely to fit within the products liabil-
ity theory. A person injured in this way is not a product user 
or consumer and the manufacturer or seller of the hazardous 
substance could not generally anticipate such harm from the 
manufacture or sale of his product. This would be particularly 
true where, as would often be the case, the product undergoes 
substantial change by the time it is disposed of as waste. 
It is not at all clear which, if any, of the strict liability theories 
the Minnesota Supreme Court has adopted. The court specifi-
288. [d. at 31-32, 239 N.W.2d at 193-94. 
289. See id. 
290. Mahowald v. Minnesota Gas Co., 344 N.W.2d 856 (Minn. 1984). For a dis-
cussion of Mahowald, see II WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 599 (1985). 
291. See McCormack v. Hankscraft, 278 Minn. 327,154 N.W.2d488 (1967); see also 
Steenson, The Anatomy of Products Liability in Minnesota: The Theories of Recovery, 6 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. I (1980). 
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cally mentioned the "abnormally dangerous" test to the exclu-
sion of the other tests in three recent cases292 and has 
discussed and analyzed the "ultrahazardous" test only once.293 
In its most recent discussion of strict liability theory, however, 
the court appeared to reject the "abnormally dangerous" 
test.294 In response to plaintiffs argument for application of 
that test, the court concluded that "our attention [has not] 
been directed to any. . . case where we did apply" the abnor-
mally dangerous test.295 The court discussed but did not apply 
the Rylands v. Fletcher test.296 
In the first case tried in which claims based on MERLA 
arose, however, the district court found as a matter of law that 
both the Rylands v. Fletcher and abnormally dangerous activity 
theories were applicable.297 The court also considered, but 
did not submit to the jury, an "environmental tort" theory of 
liability: a doctrine imposing strict liability for injury or harm 
resulting from the manufacture, storage, or disposal of hazard-
ous or toxic chemical wastes. Though this case did not involve 
any personal injury claims, the court's rationale, set out in a 
lengthy and thorough set of findings, conclusions, and a mem-
orandum, would apply as readily in such a case.29B 
The apparent confusion on the part of the Minnesota 
Supreme Court as to the circumstances giving rise to strict lia-
bility makes the availability of any of these common law causes 
of action to toxic substance victims rather speculative. Of 
course, MERLA establishes strict liability as the basis of its 
cause of action but in cases where MERLA does not apply, the 
availability of strict liability as a matter of common law is an 
open question. Section 115B.06 of MERLA, which amounts to 
a limitation on MERLA's strict liability cause of action, pro-
vides that if the defendant can show that the plaintiffs dam-
ages were caused by the release of a hazardous substance that 
was placed in a facility "wholly before January 1, 1973," it is a 
292. See Seim v. Garavalia. 306 N.W.2d 806 (Minn. 1981); Armstrong v. Mailand. 
284 N.W.2d 343 (Minn. 1979); Ferguson v. Northern States Power Co .• 307 Minn. 
26.31-32.239 N.W.2d 190. 194 (1976). 
293. See Cairl v. City of St. Paul. 268 N.W.2d 908 (Minn. 1978). 
294. Mahowald, 344 N.W.2d 856. 
295. Id. at 861. 
296. Ill. 
297. See State ex rei Boise Cascade Corp. v. Onan Corp., No. B-46882, Anoka 
County Dist. Ct. (Hon. Daniel M. Kammeyer). 
298. See ill. 
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defense to liability under section 115B.05 that the activity by 
which the hazardous substance came to be located in the place 
from which it was released "was not an abnormally dangerous 
activity." This language suggests that the legislature believes 
that the proper test for strict liability arising, not under 
MERLA's provision (§ 115B.05) but as a matter of common 
law, is the abnormally dangerous test from section 520 of the 
Second Restatement of Torts. On the other hand, this lan-
guage in section 115B.06(2) may be viewed as a separate statu-
tory cause of action for injuries caused by a certain category of 
hazardous substance releases (those occurring wholly before 
January 1, 1973) which incorporates the abnormally dangerous 
standard and leaves to the court the determination of whether 
the activity giving rise to injury in the case at hand was abnor-
mally dangerous. Many hazardous substance releases seem 
more like the classic Rylands case of escape of a dangerous in-
strumentality than does transmission of electricity, which was 
the act involved in Ferguson. Perhaps this greater similarity 
could persuade the Minnesota Supreme Court to make that 
strict liability cause of action available as a matter of common 
law in circumstances where the MERLA cause of action is not 
available. Finally, the environmental tort theory of liability 
recognized by one district court could be adopted by the 
Supreme, Court as well. 
4. Non-law Remedies: Insurance 
A non-law remedy worth brief mention is the availability of 
insurance coverage for injury and damages occurring as a re-
sult of hazardous substance exposure. This coverage basically 
falls into two categories, direct and indirect coverage. Direct 
coverage refers to the situation in which the injured or dam-
aged party is the named insured beneficiary of some insurance 
policy. This policy may be private insurance provided by the 
injured party himself, his family or his employer, or may be 
public insurance such as Social Security Disability or Medicare 
or Medicaid coverage. A person insured in this way may be 
compensated for personal injuries suffered as a result of expo-
sure to hazardous substances up to the limits of the policy's 
coverage. Indirect insurance refers to the situation in which 
the party causing the injury is insured and the person suffering 
the injury obtains some right or agreement to compensation 
from the insured party, which compensation is then paid by the 
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insurer.299 
Regardless of the source of insurance coverage, for those 
persons injured or suffering damage as a result of exposure to 
hazardous substances there will be many variations in the avail-
ability of insurance coverage. Even for those that are insured, 
there are many variations in the extent of insurance coverage 
both with respect to the types of injuries or damages covered 
and dollar limitations in the forms of deductible amounts or 
maximum liability limits in the insurance policy. Even for 
those persons who may be covered for health effects damages 
resulting from hazardous substance exposure, there is little 
likelihood that their insurance would cover property damage 
problems such as the provision of a new drinking water supply. 
It is perhaps effectively impossible to determine precisely 
which Minnesotans are covered by insurance of some kind 
either directly or indirectly and, if covered, what compensation 
limitations that insurance coverage may entail. A recent study 
indicates that between eight and nine percent of adult Ameri-
cans are uninsured.30o It is certain, however, that the many 
variations in both the availability and extent of insurance cov-
erage do not represent an effective existing compensation 
mechanism for a person suffering personal injury or other 
losses due to exposure to hazardous substances. 
C. Summary 
The common law remedies that predated the passage of 
MERLA in 1983 are collectively an inefficient and ineffective 
mechanism for responding to injuries and losses occurring as a 
result of exposure to hazardous substances. The problems 
with these causes of action make recovery for toxics-injured 
victims especially difficult. Some of these common law theo-
ries may not even be available to a toxics-injured victim. In-
deed, the creation of a statutory strict liability cause of action 
in MERLA is a legislative confirmation of the inadequacies of 
common law rights and remedies. 
Implied private rights of action under the various federal 
hazardous substance regulatory programs are very unlikely to 
be available in light of the United States Supreme Court's re-
cent analysis and conclusions on the implied rights question. 
299. See supra text accompanying notes 177-91. 
300. National Underwriter, Dec. 30, 1983, at 18, col. 1. 
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No existing statutory remedies, except section 115B.05 of 
MERLA, are designed to respond to the personal injury 
problem. 
Private and public insurance are no guarantee of adequate 
compensation, especially for the most needy who are least able 
to afford health and life insurance. 
MERLA's strict liability cause of action was created essen-
tially as a response to these inadequacies. MERLA's response 
is clearly a step in the right direction. By making it clear that 
liability is strict, the large and potentially insurmountable hur-
dle of having to show a defendant's fault, especially for past 
actions where evidence of the defendant's conduct may no 
longer exist and the applicable standard of care may have been 
much lower than it would now be, is eliminated. The causation 
provision demonstrates the legislature's concern about this dif-
ficult barrier to recovery for injured persons but the provision 
is unlikely to alleviate that problem. 
Even under MERLA, however, a number of potential 
problems for the victims of hazardous substance exposure re-
main. To begin with, not all toxic and hazardous substances 
which might cause human injury are covered by MERLA nor 
are all releases of those substances subject to MERLA's liabil-
ity provisions. Not all damages which may result from hazard-
ous substance exposure may be recoverable under MERLA 
because of the limits on joint and several and retroactive liabil-
ity. There may be a cap on recovery of damages, such as the 
liability limit of political subdivisions or the liability limit for 
any jointly liable defendant who can apportion his liability 
under the Comparative Fault Act. A further important limita-
tion is the retroactivity limit in MERLA. For releases occurring 
wholly before July 1, 1983, or deposits wholly before 1960, 
MERLA's strict liability is not available. These limitations may 
be perfectly sensible for private lawsuit purposes. Indeed, they 
are in the Act as the result of a considerable amount of legisla-
tive consideration. But they restrict the availability of full com-
pensation for all victims. 
More importantly, while MERLA may somewhat reduce the 
single most substantial hurdle faced by victims of hazardous 
substance exposure-to prove, in a costly and complicated 
lawsuit, the specific cause of their injury-proof of causation 
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remains a substantial hurdle. The substantial costs oflitigation 
remain unchanged by the creation of MER LA's cause of action. 
When all available legal remedies are assessed, it is clear that 
a person injured by exposure to a hazardous substance can, for 
many reasons, be barred from access to any of those remedies. 
No non-legal compensation mechanism reliably fills the gap 
represented by those who remain uncompensated or un-
dercompensated. One must therefore conclude that existing 
remedies and compensation systems are inadequate and, when 
combined with the potential number of persons who may be 
injured in this way, further conclude that something needs to 
be done as a matter of sound public policy. 
III. A VICTIM COMPENSATION PROGRAM FOR MINNESOTA 
All of the significant studies301 which have addressed the 
problem of personal injury due to hazardous substance expo-
sure have reached essentially the same conclusion: present 
laws and other compensation mechanisms are an inadequate 
response to personal injuries in the hazardous substances con-
text. Of course, the only study that specifically addresses the 
problem of compensating personal injury victims of hazardous 
substance exposure in Minnesota is the LCWM's 1984 Study. 
After assessing the need for compensation and available 
mechanisms, including tort claims, for providing such compen-
sation, the Study concludes that persons injured by exposure 
to hazardous substances may, for a number of reasons, not be 
compensated fully or at all for their injuries.302 With respect to 
the issue of creating some kind of administrative victim com-
pensation fund system, the Study concludes that in light of the 
assessed needs and the many other important problems cur-
rently before the legislature, no victim compensation fund 
should now be established.303 However, in anticipation that 
new information or changed legislative priorities may lead to 
the creation of such a system, the Study analyzes a whole series 
of issues that arise in structuring and financing such a fund and 
301. See, e.g., 301 (e) REPORT, supra note 4; Trauberman, supra note 9; LEGISLATIVE 
COMMISSION ON WASTE MANAGEMENT, A STUDY OF COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF 
HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE EXPOSURE (P. Hamilton &J.D. Prince 1984) [hereinafter cited 
as LCWM STUDY). 
302. See LCWM STUDY, supra note 301, pt. III, at 90. 
303. See gtmerally id. at 162. 
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makes recommendations to the legislature respecting such is-
sues.304 This section summarizes the LCWM recommenda-
tions and focuses briefly on some of them. 
A. The LCWM Recommendations 
The LCWM Study recommends that, if a state fund is estab-
lished, it be administered by an appointed, three-member 
board housed in or identical with the existing Crime Victims 
Reparation Board, the name of which would be changed to the 
Victims Compensation Board. The full board would hear and 
decide each claim. It would be authorized to advertise or 
otherwise notify potential claimants of their option of claiming 
against the fund.305 
All parties affected by covered diseases and injuries would 
be eligible to file a claim, subject to a time limitation of a few 
years between the date of filing and the date the injury could 
reasonably have been tied to the exposure. Covered diseases 
and injuries would not include those arising as a result of 
workplace and consumer product exposures, but otherwise 
there would be no restrictions placed on eligibility to claim. 
Injured parties could either make a claim to the fund or pursue 
existing tort remedies. Use of one system would not prevent 
access to the other, but double recovery would be prohibited. 
The information required in the claim would include proof 
of exposure to a hazardous substance, proof of a covered in-
jury or disease which has resulted in economic loss, and proof 
that it is more likely than not that the exposure caused or sig-
nificantly contributed to the disease or injury. 
Compensation to injured parties would include eighty to 
ninety percent of all medical expenses up to a predetermined 
level, and 100% of all medical expenses thereafter.306 Com-
pensation would include lost wages, lost household labor, and 
lost profits, the sum of which could not exceed a fixed percent-
age of the average wages in the county where the injury arose. 
This compensation would also apply if the injured party died, 
except it would be paid to dependents in the amounts they 
would receive as dependents after the decedent's consumption 
was subtracted. Property damages would be covered in full, if 
304. See id. at 106-60. 
305. See id. at 162. 
306. /d. at 163. 
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they were not otherwise compensated by other sources. Pain 
and suffering and other non-pecuniary losses would not be 
covered. 
An overall ceiling of $250,000 is recommended to avoid 
bankrupting the fund and to encourage the use of the tort sys-
tem for very large damages. To lower the burden on the fund, 
a small minimum claim amount is also recommended, and any 
collateral sources of funds such as insurance would also be 
deducted. 
Appeal would be allowed only if constitutional rights require 
it. This prevents duplicative transaction costs and decisions by 
a judge less informed and skilled on the issues than the Board. 
Finally, the Study recommends that the fund should be fi-
nanced by general revenues "to avoid placing an additional 
burden on Minnesota businesses at a time when efforts are be-
ing made to improve the state's business climate."307 When-
ever a claim was paid, a right of subrogation would be acquired 
by the fund. The Study recommends that this subrogation 
right be used whenever cost effective in large claims or particu-
larly egregious actions. 
In light of the concerns raised earlier about the existing sys-
tem for compensation, a few of these recommendations call for 
comment. 
B. Claimant Eligibility 
The LCWM Study discusses various approaches to the cov-
erage issue, including limiting eligibility to victims of "orphan" 
sites (for which no responsible party now exists) or insolvent 
defendants (determined only after a judgment is obtained in a 
lawsuit but cannot be wholly satisfied). It concludes that all 
injured parties should be allowed to make claims regardless of 
whether they could be compensated under the tort system, but 
that the fund would not cover "diseases or injuries that result 
from workplace exposure or exposure to a consumer prod-
UCt."308 While it would be fairly easy to distinguish workplace 
injuries simply by reference to workers' compensation law, de-
termining which injuries are due to "exposure to a consumer 
product" would not be so easy. 
307. Id. 
308. Id. at 126. 
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A determination that an injury was not workplace-related 
can be made under the existing body of workers' compensa-
tion law on that issue. Whatever the decision, the injury would 
either be covered by workers' compensation insurance or rep-
resent an eligible claim to the victims compensation fund. 
Plaintiffs injured due to exposure to a consumer product 
would not be eligible to claim against the fund, presumably 
because of the view that consumer product liability law is ade-
quately developed to respond to such injuries.309 The Study 
does not discuss how one is to determine whether such an in-
jury is so caused. In some cases that determination might be 
easy; in others it would not. For example, what about an injury 
due to exposure to a product originally sold in the consumer 
marketplace but found discarded in a landfill at the time of ex-
posure? Is that an injury "due to exposure to a consumer 
product"? The statutory provisions defining eligible claims 
would need to address this issue specifically and with as much 
clarity as possible. 
C. Access to Both Administrative Compensation and Tort Systems 
The Study discusses the degree to which a new administra-
tive compensation fund should complement or substitute for 
the existing tort system. It discusses compulsory use of the 
fund, an approach similar to that taken by a workers' compen-
sation system for work-related injuries; binding election be-
tween a tort and an administrative claim, an approach in which 
an injured party would choose one system or the other and be 
bound by that choice; and finally recommends access to both 
systems with provisions to prevent double recovery.310 This is 
essentially the approach recommended by the 301(e) Report 
and has the same faults. 
The essential argument for this approach is that it would al-
low needy claimants to seek immediate compensation from the 
fund without giving up their "rights" to later seek a larger re-
covery in a tort action. One disadvantage to this scheme is that 
the fund recovery can be used to finance a tort suit that might 
otherwise not be brought. If the purpose of the fund award is 
to make the injured cl~imant whole, it should not be used to 
309. Cf. Trauberman, supra note 9, at 221 (Model Statute focuses coverage on in-
juries least adequately covered by traditional tort and compensation systems). 
310. See LCWM STUDY, supra note 301, pt. III, at 127. 
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gamble on a tort recovery. More importantly, in light of the 
earlier discussion of the very high transaction costs associated 
with tort litigation, this scheme could result in duplicative 
transaction costs. The claimant cannot recover twice, and if 
first the fund is used and then a tort suit is commenced, the 
costs of making the compensation transaction become unac-
ceptably high. 
It would be much better to adopt either a binding election or 
compulsory use of the fund approach. The choice between 
these two approaches depends on a number of factors includ-
ing the compensation limits set on awards from the fund, the 
source of financing for the fund, and one's views about the ap-
propriate balance between full compensation and efficiency in 
the compensation system.311 
Requiring compulsory use of the administrative compensa-
tion remedy would preclude use of the existing tort system al-
together. This approach has some attractive aspects. 
Compulsory use of the fund would create the largest reduction 
in evidentiary costs and free the judicial system from potential 
overloading and congestion.312 It would also diminish the pos-
sibility that toxic tort defendants would incur crippling finan-
cial losses from many damage awards. Understandably, this 
approach is favored by the defense bar.313 So long as compen-
sation limits are not set too low, claimants would be adequately 
compensated and the social costs of compensation would be 
greatly reduced. 
Eliminating the tort system, however, overlooks some worth-
while benefits of that system. A tort system remedy may allow 
plaintiffs the opportunity to receive larger measures of dam-
ages, such as pain and suffering, that an administrative system 
may not provide.314 Tort suits also assess liability in direct re-
lationship to responsibility for injury and, though there is no 
good evidence that they do, are alleged to encourage reason-
able care and discourage carelessness.315 Finally, with respect 
311. See id. 
312. See id. at 129; 301(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. 1, at 185. 
313. LCWM STUDY, supra note 301, at 129 (footnote omitted) (citing CALIFORNIA 
HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT COUNCIL, STATUTORY AND COMMON LAw LIABILITY 
FOR INJURY AND DAMAGE CAUSED BY RELEASES OF HAZARDOUS WASTE 265 (1983». 
314. LCWM STUDY, supra note 301, at 129 (citing 301 (e) REPORT, supra note 4, pI. 
1, at 185). 
315. See supra note 314. 
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to actually legislating such a system into existence, foreclosure 
of access to the tort system would likely generate heated oppo-
sition from the plaintiffs bar. 
By requiring a toxic tort victim to make a binding election 
between tort and administrative remedies, the claimant must 
choose one system and is then foreclosed from later using the 
other. This approach has some advantages. First, it retains the 
existing tort system for those who cannot bear to see it go. If 
the fund is designed so as to provide adequate compensation, 
victims would generally be satisfied with their recoveries and 
feel no need to go to the tort system. Second, it avoids the 
duplication of costs problem raised by the approach recom-
mended in the Study.316 
If the fund is financed wholly or largely by special revenues 
generated by taxing the hazardous substance industry, binding 
election is the worst of all possible worlds to defendants. They 
would not only pay to finance the fund's payment of most 
claims but would obtain no protection from the extraordinarily 
large claims which are likely to be made the subject of a tort 
suit. Furthermore, if the primary goal of the fund is to provide 
adequate compensation to victims at the lowest social cost, 
there is no need to offer plaintiffs the option of tort actions and 
their attendant high costs in adition to to a well-designed 
fund. 317 
D. The Decisionmaking Process 
The Study proposes a claim decisionmaking process that is 
essentially non-adversarial in nature by arguing that there is no 
sense in shifting the problems associated with the adversarial, 
private tort law claim resolution process into an administrative 
context. The decisionmaking board should act not so much as 
a defendant but rather as a neutral, expert decisionmaker with 
respect to these claims. In keeping with this concept, the sys-
tem should avoid the need for expensive evidence gathering 
and presentation, and lengthy oral proceedings. The criteria 
established for compensation must be designed to facilitate the 
compensation of orily meritorious claims. To serve this goal, 
the Study recommends the adoption of thresholds which, if 
316. LCWM STUDY, supra note 301, pt. III, at 129. 
317. [d. at 130. 
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satisfied, would result in a decision to compensate.1H8 
The thresholds which the claimant's information and evi-
dence must satisfy in order to be compensated are: (1) the 
claimant must suffer or have suffered death, injury or disease 
which has caused a compensable loss (which would be defined 
by statute); and (2) the claimant must have been exposed to a 
hazardous substance in an amount and duration sufficient to 
cause or significantly contribute to death or an injury or dis-
ease of the type suffered by the claimant.1H9 If the board be-
lieves, on the basis of the information before it, that it is more 
likely than not that each of these thresholds is satisfied, it 
would compensate the claimant. 
In many cases, the claim could be determined largely or 
even exclusively on the basis of medical reports and other doc-
umentary evidence submitted by the claimant, as is generally 
done in social security disability determinations. Some claims 
could no doubt be made and decided without the assistance of 
a lawyer. These features would tend to keep down the costs of 
the compensation transaction. As final emphasis to the low-
cost, non-adversarial theme, the Study recommends a lim-
ita ton on appeals of awards made by the fund since appeals 
interfere with prompt final resolution and should therefore be 
allowed only when necessary to ensure constitutional 
fairness. 32o 
The requisite fairness would be satisfied by observance of 
constitutional due process requirements. The administrative 
board would be bound to fully compensate victims, within the 
compensation limits, and the collegial nature of the decision-
making process would ensure that no one individual's mistakes 
will adversely affect claimants. 
Many seem to feel that the more often the same matter is 
decided, the more likely it is that the last decision on the mat-
ter will be correct. This belief may be based on a perception 
that a fact or opinion on some matter exists independently of 
some human decisionmaker's perception. But that is obviously 
not the case. There is no reason to think that a judge'S deci-
sion on a compensation matter is any more likely to be correct 
than the administrative expert's initial determination on the 
318. /d. at 134. 
319. Id. 
320. Id. at 163. 
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same matter (assuming both have access to the same informa-
tion). Indeed, there is better reason to think that the judge 
and his decision on appeal may be wrong and the initial expert 
decision right in these circumstances. Of course, one must as-
sume that the decisionmaking process is fair. Adherence to 
constitutional due process requirements assures that fairness. 
Such constitutional issues should therefore be appealable. On 
all other issues appeal should be precluded.321 
E. Compensating Property and Non-Pecuniary Losses 
The Study recommends compensation subject to some ceil-
ings; co-insurance payment requirements of ten to twenty per-
cent to stimulate the patient's interest in reducing health care 
costs; and collateral source deductions of medical expenses, 
lost income, and death benefits. All of these make perfect 
sense in an administrative system designed to compensate per-
sonal injury victims. However, it also recommends compensa-
tion for property damages and it recommends against 
compensation for pain and suffering and other non-pecuniary 
losses. 
While there is no question that one may suffer property 
damage as well as personal injury due to hazardous substance 
exposure, any administrative scheme designed to respond to 
the personal injury compensation problem ought to deal ex-
clusively with that problem. While in theory it is as important 
to compensate for property injuries as for personal injuries, 
there are important practical reasons for limiting compensa-
tion from the fund to personal injuries. Very simply, payment 
for property losses could bankrupt or seriously dilute the re-
sources of the fund so that it would not be possible to respond 
adequately to personal injury claims.322 Further, Minnesota al-
ready has a property damages fund of sorts in MELRA, the 
state superfund. If more extensive property loss compensation 
is needed, it makes more sense to expand the superfund rather 
than to cover such losses in a new fund designed principally to 
aid personal injury victims. 
Neither the LCWM nor any of the other major studies rec-
ommend inclusion of pain and suffering as an element of com-
321. [d. at 148-50. 
322. [d. at 163. 
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pensation in an administrative scheme.323 Pain and suffering 
compensation is an integral part of the tort system and many 
attorneys feel that such awards are essential to making the in-
jured party whole. This is particularly true when pain and suf-
fering is large and the pecuniary award is small. However, 
many arguments can be raised against allowing damages for 
pain and suffering. Parties have differing pain thresholds and 
pain and suffering is difficult to quantify. It is an element of 
compensation in which awards typically vary a great deal. Fur-
thermore, individuals generally do not insure themselves 
against pain and suffering.324 Because such damages are so 
speculative and decisionmakers so susceptible to emotional in-
fluence on the issue, neither pain and suffering nor other non-
pecuniary losses, such as fear and trauma, should be compen-
sated by an administrative fund. 
F. Fund Subrogation Rights 
The Study points out that the question of whether the fund 
should obtain, upon payment of compensation to a victim, a 
subrogation right to pursue a recovery against the injury-caus-
ing party is a complex one that is closely tied to the source of 
fund financing. 325 Ifa victim compensation fund were financed 
exclusively by special revenues derived in appropriate propor-
tions from all whose actions contribute to hazardous substance 
personal injuries, then rights of subrogation and actions based 
on those rights against injury-causing parties are inappropriate 
because those parties are already paying for the costs of their 
activities. Furthermore, they already have the economic incen-
tive to reduce the risk posed by their activities because doing 
so will reduce their taxes. Subrogation actions in these circum-
stances result in making parties against whom such claims are 
successful pay twice and, in theory, generate more revenues 
than needed by the fund. Another disadvantage of subroga-
tion rights is that they create the prospect of litigation and all 
of its problems that the fund is designed to avoid. 
Because the Study recommends general revenue financing 
exclusively, it recommends that the fund obtain subrogation 
323. Id. at 142. 
324. See id. 
325. See id. at 156. 
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rights to be exercised at the discretion of the board.326 Subro-
gation rights are most likely to be pursued where the recovery 
from the fund has been relatively large, so that the costs of 
pursuing the claim are more likely to be outweighed by the 
recovery, or where the injury-causing act has been particularly 
egregious rather than purely accidental. Successful use of this 
right will help avoid depletion of the fund's resources, though 
subrogation recoveries are unlikely to represent a very signifi-
cant portion of the fund. Furthermore, if only large claims are 
pursued, the number of subrogation actions is unlikely to be 
large so the goal of avoiding· the costs of private tort actions is 
not signficantly compromised.327 
CONCLUSION 
The problem of assuring adequate compensation to those 
injured as a result of exposure to hazardous substances has 
been and continues to be a matter of much debate. The legis-
lature has shown a continuing interest in this problem and has 
responded by creating a statutory cause of action in MERLA. 
The limitations of that remedy combined with the limitations 
associated with other existing remedies justify serious consid-
eration of an administrative compensation program. The 
LCWM Study represents the most current examination of the 
complex and interrelated issues raised by the prospect of an 
administrative compensation program. While the LCWM rec-
ommendations are generally sensible, some are inconsistent 
with the goal of a fair and efficient personal injury compensa-
tion program. These faults can, however, be cured in the crea-
tion of any legislation which may result from that Study. 
326. See id. at 163. 
327. See id. at 156-57. 
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